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Abstract A sentence like Mary wonders whether Ann, Bill or Carol broke the
vase implies that Mary still consider all disjuncts possible. This inference has been
referred to as a distributive ignorance inference (Roelofsen & Uegaki 2016). We
present two experiments examining the distributive ignorance inferences triggered
by two verbs, wonder and believe, with different types of complements and different
types of quantificational subjects.
The results of these experiments show that the distributive ignorance inferences
triggered by the two verbs pattern very much alike. We argue that the data are best
explained by an account that involves a strengthening mechanism which is sensitive
to the syntactic structure of the complement of the verbs involved and optionally
applies locally, as part of the semantic composition process.
Keywords: ignorance inferences, wonder, believe, local strengthening
1 Introduction
Consider the following sentence:
(1) The detective wonders whether Ann, Bill, or Carol did it.
This sentence implies that the detective doesn’t know yet whether Ann did it, that he
doesn’t know yet whether Bill did it, and that he doesn’t know yet whether Carol did
it. Roelofsen & Uegaki (2016) call this distributive ignorance. Note that distributive
ignorance is a stronger form of ignorance than merely not knowing the answer to
the embedded question in (1), i.e., the question whether Ann, Bill, or Carol did it.
* We are grateful to Kyle Blumberg, Ivano Ciardelli, Jakub Dotlačil, Clemens Mayr, Yael Sharvit and
Yimei Xiang for discussion. We would also like to thank our S&P editor Kristen Syrett, Aaron Steven
White, and two anonymous reviewers for very helpful comments on earlier versions of the paper.
Finally, we gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific










If the detective already knows that Carol didn’t do it, but still wonders whether it
was Ann or Bill, then he doesn’t yet know the answer to the question whether Ann,
Bill, or Carol did it. Thus, he is still ignorant to some extent. Distributive ignorance,
however, requires more than this: the detective should still consider all three options
possible.
Roelofsen & Uegaki (2016) show that the distributive ignorance inferences that
sentences like (1) give rise to are not predicted by previous work on the semantics of
wonder (Ciardelli & Roelofsen 2015, Uegaki 2015), even if pragmatic strengthening
is taken into account. Based on various further empirical observations, they develop
a refined semantic entry for wonder.
It seems, however, that distributive ignorance inferences (henceforth, DIIs) may
well constitute a broader phenomenon, not specific to wonder. In particular, epistemic
predicates like believe seem to give rise to similar inferences. To see this, consider
the sentence in (2):
(2) The detective believes that Ann, Bill, or Carol did it.
Just like (1), this sentence also seems to imply that the detective still considers all of
Ann, Bill, and Carol possible culprits.
The goal of the present paper is to investigate experimentally whether the igno-
rance inferences triggered by wonder and believe indeed call for a unified account,
and if so, what the main empirical desiderata for such an account are.1 More specifi-
cally, we report the results of two experiments, each of which is designed to address
a basic question about the nature of DIIs triggered by wonder and believe. The
first experiment addresses the question whether DIIs are structure-sensitive. More
specifically, we examine the extent to which DIIs persist when wonder and believe
take different kinds of complements. For instance, sentences like (1) and (2), which
involve disjunctive complements, are compared with sentences like (3) and (4) below,
which involve a wh-phrase and existential quantification, respectively.
(3) The detective wonders which of the girls did it.
(4) The detective believes that one of the girls did it.
Our second experiment addresses another basic issue, namely whether DIIs are
computed locally, as part of the semantic composition process, or rather result from
global pragmatic reasoning. More specifically, we examine what kind of ignorance
inferences arise if wonder and believe take different kinds of quantificational sub-
1 Besides wonder and believe, many other predicates that have some inquisitive or epistemic meaning
component seem to trigger DIIs as well (e.g., be curious, investigate, suspect, be certain, hope). We
restrict ourselves here to wonder and believe, leaving a detailed investigation of this broader range of
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jects (upward monotonic, downward monotonic, or non-monotonic) rather than a
referential expression like the detective. For instance, we consider sentences like (5)
and (6) below. Whether such sentences are judged true or false in certain scenarios
crucially depends on whether DIIs are computed locally or globally.2
(5) Every detective wonders whether Ann, Bill, or Carol did it.
(6) No detective believes that Ann, Bill, or Carol did it.
The overall results of the two experiments show that DIIs triggered by wonder and
believe behave very similarly. This means that the results do not provide any grounds
to reject the hypothesis that DIIs triggered by wonder and believe arise from the same
mechanism. Of course we cannot exclude the possibility that future experimental
findings will refute this hypothesis. However, in view of the experimental data
gathered here, the most parsimonious account is one that derives DIIs triggered
by wonder and believe in a unified way. Moreover, the results also provide some
important clues as to what such a unified account should look like. In particular,
the patterns we find suggest that DIIs result from a strengthening mechanism which
is sensitive to the syntactic structure of the complement of the verbs involved (cf.,
Katzir 2007) and optionally applies locally, as part of the semantic composition
process (cf., Chierchia et al. 2012). We spell out a concrete account of DIIs that is
compatible with these findings.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our baseline
lexical entries for believe and wonder and show that these entries by themselves
do not account for DIIs. In Section 3 we outline various possible refinements of
this baseline account, and discuss how these may be teased apart experimentally. In
Sections 4 we present the results of our first experiment, involving different kinds of
complements. In Section 5 we turn to our second experiment, involving different
kinds of quantificational subjects. Finally, Section 6 provides a general discussion of
the results and explicates the theoretical approach that they support in further detail.
Section 7 concludes.
2 A baseline account of wonder and believe, and its limitations
For concreteness, we will fix a specific baseline account of wonder and believe, and
the complements that they take. For wonder we will adopt the analysis proposed in
Ciardelli & Roelofsen (2015), which is formulated in inquisitive semantics (Ciardelli
2 As we will see, our experimental results go beyond what could have been established by eliciting
judgments from a small sample of informants. The quantitative differences between some of the












et al. 2013, 2018).3 For believe we will adopt the canonical lexical entry, rooted
in epistemic logic (Hintikka 1962). For uniformity we will formulate this entry
in inquisitive semantics as well, though nothing in our discussion will hinge on
this. We will briefly review the relevant notions from inquisitive semantics (§2.1)
and the semantic analysis of declarative and interrogative complements we assume
(§2.2). Then we will spell out our baseline account of wonder and believe (§2.3-2.4),
and finally we will show that this account by itself falls short of deriving DIIs for
sentences like (1) and (2) (§2.5).
2.1 Inquisitive semantics background
In inquisitive semantics, declarative and interrogative clauses are taken to have the
same kind of semantic value, namely a set of propositions. The conceptual motivation
behind this uniform notion of sentence meaning is as follows. While traditionally the
semantic value of a sentence ϕ is intended to capture just the information conveyed
by ϕ , in inquisitive semantics it is intended to capture the issue expressed by ϕ as
well. To achieve this, the semantic value of ϕ , JϕK, is construed as the set of those
propositions that:
(i) resolve the issue that ϕ expresses (if any) and
(ii) do not contain any possible worlds that are ruled out by the information that
ϕ conveys (if any).
For instance, the semantic value of the declarative sentence Ann left is the set of
propositions consisting exclusively of worlds in which Ann left.
(7) JAnn leftK = {p | ∀w ∈ p : Ann left in w}
Let us check that these are indeed the propositions that satisfy conditions (i) and (ii)
above. First, since the sentence does not express any (non-trivial) issue, condition
(i) is automatically satisfied. On the other hand, the sentence does convey the
information that Ann left, so condition (ii) is only satisfied by those propositions
that do not contain any worlds in which Ann didn’t leave. This is exactly the set of
propositions in (7).
Similarly, the semantic value of the interrogative sentence Did Ann leave? is the
set of propositions which either consist exclusively of worlds in which Ann left, or
exclusively of worlds in which Ann didn’t leave.
3 See Uegaki (2015) for a closely related analysis, and Theiler et al. (2017a) for comparison. For earlier
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(8) JDid Ann leave?K
= {p | ∀w ∈ p : Ann left in w} ∪ {p | ∀w ∈ p : Ann didn’t leave in w}
In this case, since the sentence does not convey any (non-trivial) information,
condition (ii) is automatically satisfied. On the other hand, condition (i) is only
satisfied by propositions which resolve the issue whether Ann left, i.e., ones which
either establish that Ann did leave or that she didn’t. This is exactly the set of
propositions in (8).
Downward-closure and alternatives The set of propositions associated with a
sentence ϕ in inquisitive semantics is always downward closed. That is, if JϕK
contains a proposition p then it must also contain any stronger proposition q ⊂ p.
This is because, if p resolves the issue expressed by ϕ and does not contain any
worlds that are ruled out by the information conveyed by ϕ , then the same must
hold for any q⊂ p. As a limit case, it is assumed that the inconsistent proposition, /0,
trivially resolves all issues, and is therefore included in the semantic value of every
sentence. For any set of propositions P we will write P↓ for the set of propositions
q which are contained in some p ∈P:
(9) P↓ := {q | q⊆ p for some p ∈P}
This allows for a compact notation of semantic values in inquisitive semantics. For
instance, the semantic values of Ann left and Did Ann leave? can be written concisely
as follows.
(10) JAnn leftK = {{w | Ann left in w}}↓
(11) JDid Ann leave?K =
{
{w | Ann left in w},
{w | Ann didn’t leave in w}
}↓
Note that the maximal elements of JϕK are those propositions that contain pre-
cisely enough information to resolve the issue expressed by ϕ; other propositions
in JϕK resolve the issue expressed by ϕ as well, but contain additional information
which may be irrelevant. For instance, the propositions {w | Ann left in w} and
{w | Ann and Betty left in w} both resolve the issue expressed by Did Ann leave?.
However, while the former contains precisely enough information to do so, the
latter contains the additional information that Betty left. The maximal elements
in JϕK are referred to in the inquisitive semantics literature as the alternatives that ϕ
introduces. Declarative statements always introduce a single alternative. Questions
on the other hand introduce multiple alternatives, and these alternatives correspond











thus similar here to its use in Hamblin/alternative semantics (Hamblin 1973, Kratzer
& Shimoyama 2002, Alonso-Ovalle 2006).4
Informative content and truth The set of all worlds that are compatible with
the information that ϕ conveys is
⋃
JϕK. This set of worlds is referred to as the
informative content of ϕ and is denoted as info(ϕ). For instance, the informative
content of Ann left is the set of all worlds in which Ann left, and the informative
content of Did Ann leave? is the set of all worlds in which Ann either left or didn’t
leave, that is, the set of all worlds whatsoever. In general, the informative content of
a question is always trivial, in the sense that it always comprises all worlds that are
compatible with what the question presupposes.
While in inquisitive semantics the semantic value of ϕ evidently does not cor-
respond one-to-one to the truth-conditions of ϕ , it does determine these truth-
conditions. Namely, ϕ is true in a world w just in case w is not ruled out by the
information conveyed by ϕ . So ϕ is true in w if and only if w∈ info(ϕ), or formulated
directly in terms of semantic content, if and only if w ∈
⋃
JϕK.
Informative and inquisitive sentences A sentence ϕ is called informative if and
only if its informative content is non-trivial, i.e., info(ϕ) 6=W . Similarly, it is called
inquisitive just in case the issue it expresses is non-trivial. This is the case if and
only if in determining the semantic value of ϕ , condition (i) above is not trivially
satisfied, i.e., if being an element of JϕK requires more than just consisting of worlds
that are compatible with the information conveyed by ϕ . This holds if and only if
info(ϕ) 6∈ JϕK.
If ϕ is non-inquisitive, it introduces a unique alternative, namely info(ϕ). Vice
versa, if ϕ introduces multiple alternatives, it is inquisitive. For instance, Ann left is
informative but non-inquisitive, while conversely, Did Ann leave? is inquisitive but
non-informative.
These are all the notions from inquisitive semantics that are needed here: the
semantic content of a sentence ϕ , JϕK, is a downward closed set of propositions,
always including /0 as a limit case; the alternatives that ϕ introduces are the maximal
elements of JϕK; info(ϕ) amounts to
⋃
JϕK; ϕ is true in w iff w ∈ info(ϕ); ϕ is
informative iff info(ϕ) 6=W ; and ϕ is inquisitive iff info(ϕ) 6∈ JϕK.
Using these notions, we now specify a semantic treatment of declarative and
interrogative complements (§2.2) and our baseline entries for believe and wonder
(§2.3-2.4).
4 Though see Ciardelli & Roelofsen (2017) for discussion of some subtle differences between these
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2.2 Declarative and interrogative complements
We assume here that declarative and interrogative complements have the same
semantic value as the corresponding matrix clauses. For instance, the declarative
complement that Ann left has the same semantic value as the matrix declarative Ann
left:
(12) Jthat Ann leftK = {{w | Ann left in w}}↓
Following Ciardelli et al. (2015) and much other work in inquisitive semantics,
we assume here that a declarative complement or matrix clause ϕ (with falling
intonation) is never inquisitive.5 That is, it always introduces a single alternative.
This holds in particular for disjunctive declaratives, which will play a prominent role
below. For example, the disjunctive complement that Ann or Betty left is taken to
have the following semantic value:
(13) Jthat Ann or Betty leftK = {{w | Ann or Betty left in w}}↓
On the other hand, we assume that interrogative complements, just like matrix
interrogatives, are never informative. This means that the propositions contained in
the semantic value of an interrogative complement clause always completely cover
the set of all possible worlds in which the presuppositions of the clause are satisfied.
The semantic values we assume for various kinds of interrogative complements
are given in (14)-(17) below, and also depicted in Figure 1. The complement in (14)
corresponds to our earlier matrix interrogative example Did Ann leave?.
(14) Jwhether Ann leftK =
{
{w | Ann left in w},
{w | Ann didn’t leave in w}
}↓
5 There is also work in inquisitive semantics that does not make this assumption (e.g., AnderBois
2012). This requires a view under which uttering an inquisitive sentence does not necessarily involve













(a) that Ann left
wab wa
wb w /0
(b) that A or B left
wab wa
wb w /0
(c) whether Ann left
wab wa
wb w /0
(d) whether A or B left
wab wa
wb w /0
(e) who left (non-exh)
wab wa
wb w /0
(f) which girl left
Figure 1 The semantic values of various kinds of complement clauses. In each
diagram, wab is a world where both Ann and Betty left, wa a world
where only Ann left, wb one in which only Betty left, and w /0 one
in which neither Ann nor Betty left. Non-trivial presuppositions are
depicted with dashed lines. Trivial presuppositions are not depicted.
Next we consider the disjunctive complement whether Ann or Betty left. Such a dis-
junctive whether-complement has two possible interpretations. It may be interpreted
as a polar question, expressing the issue whether the disjunction as a whole is true or
not, or as an alternative question, expressing the issue which of the two disjuncts is
true, presupposing that exactly one of them is. In matrix interrogatives, these two
interpretations correspond to different intonation patterns (see, e.g., Bartels 1999,
Biezma & Rawlins 2012, Pruitt & Roelofsen 2013), but in embedded contexts one
and the same intonation pattern usually allows for both interpretations (presumably,
the differences in intonation we observe in matrix cases are masked in embedded
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below we specify the semantic value and the presupposition of whether Ann or Betty
left under its alternative question interpretation. Its polar question interpretation is
very similar to that of the complement considered in (14) above. We focus here on
the alternative question interpretation because that is most relevant for our discussion
below.
(15) a. Jwhether Ann or Betty leftK=
{
{w | Ann left in w and Betty didn’t},
{w | Betty left in w and Ann didn’t}
}↓
b. presup(whether Ann or Betty left) =
{
w
∣∣∣∣ exactly one of Annand Betty left in w
}
We now turn to wh-questions. First consider who left. Let us assume that the quan-
tificational domain of the wh-phrase consists of just two individuals, Ann and Betty.
Let us further assume, as is often done in the literature, that wh-questions come with
an existential presupposition. Thus, who left presupposes that someone in the quan-
tificational domain left, i.e., either Ann or Betty, or both.6 This yields the semantic
analysis in (16):7
(16) a. Jwho leftK =
{
{w | Ann left in w},
{w | Betty left in w}
}↓
b. presup(who left) = {w | Ann or Betty left in w}
Finally, consider the complement which girl left. We assume, again following much
existing work, that this complement presupposes that exactly one girl left. We still
take the quantificational domain of the wh-phrase to consist of Ann and Betty, so the
presupposition is that exactly one of Ann and Betty left. This yields the semantic
analysis in (17):
(17) a. Jwhich girl leftK =
{
{w | only Ann left in w},
{w | only Betty left in w}
}↓
b. presup(which girl left) =
{
w
∣∣∣∣ exactly one of Annand Betty left in w
}
6 Nothing in our discussion below hinges on this assumption.
7 The semantic value assumed here captures the non-exhaustive (mention-some) reading of who left.
The account can be refined to derive strongly and intermediate exhaustive readings as well (see












Having laid out a semantic analysis of declarative and interrogative complements
which is representative for most analyses found in the literature,8 we are now ready
to specify a baseline account of believe and wonder.
2.3 Believe
We assume, in line with the canonical treatment of believe in epistemic logic (Hin-
tikka 1962) and much subsequent work, that the semantic value of a sentence of the
form x believes ϕ is the set of all propositions p consisting of worlds w in which the
doxastic state of x, DOXwx , coincides with a proposition in JϕK.9 Moreover, following
Karttunen (1974) and many others, we take x believes ϕ to presuppose that x believes
the presuppositions of ϕ , i.e., that DOXwx ⊆ presup(ϕ).10
(18) a. Jx believes ϕK = {{w | DOXwx ∈ JϕK}}↓
b. presup(x believes ϕ) = {w | DOXwx ⊆ presup(ϕ)}
Consider the following example:
(19) John believes that Ann left.
The semantic value of (19) is predicted to be the set of all propositions p consisting
of worlds w in which John’s doxastic state, DOXwj , is an element of Jthat Ann leftK.
The latter means that DOXwj must only contain worlds in which Ann left. This implies
that (19) is true in a world w if and only if all worlds in DOXwj are ones in which
Ann left. These are indeed the desired truth conditions for the sentence. As for
presuppositions, since the presupposition of the complement in (19) is trivial, i.e.,
presup(that Ann left) =W , the presupposition of the sentence as a whole is trivial
as well.
Now consider a case with a presuppositional complement:
(20) John believes that the king of France left.
8 Spelling out how the semantic values of these complements could be derived compositionally in
inquisitive semantics would take us too far afield here; see Ciardelli et al. (2015), Roelofsen (2015),
Champollion et al. (2015).
9 As usual, we take DOXwx to be the set of possible worlds that are compatible with x’s beliefs in w.
10 This canonical analysis of believe needs to be refined if we want to capture the fact that the verb
is neg-raising and does not license interrogative complements. Such refinements can be found in
Gajewski (2007), Romoli (2013), and Križ (2015), among others (for neg-raising), and in Theiler et al.
(2017a,b), Mayr (2017), and Cohen (2017) (for the incompatibility with interrogative complements).
As far as we can see, these refinements are orthogonal to the issues that concern us here and the
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The complement presupposes that there is a unique king of France. Thus, (20) as a
whole presupposes that John believes there to be a unique king of France. Further,
the semantic value of (20) is the set of all propositions p consisting of worlds w
such that DOXwj consists exclusively of worlds in which the king of France left. This
implies that (20) is true in a world w if and only if all worlds in DOXwj are ones in
which the king of France left—again, these are the desired truth conditions, which
form the core of all existing accounts of believe.
2.4 Wonder
To model what it means for an individual to wonder about something, we do not
only need a formal representation of her doxastic state, but also a representation
of the issues that she entertains, i.e., her inquisitive state. Following Ciardelli &
Roelofsen (2015), we formally model an individual x’s inquisitive state in a world w,





x . The propositions in INQ
w
x are those that contain enough
information to resolve the issues that x entertains. They correspond to extensions of
x’s current doxastic state in which all her questions are settled one way or another.
Intuitively, x wonders about a question, e.g., about who left, just in case (i) x isn’t
certain yet who left, and (ii) she wants to find out who did. This is the case exactly
if (i) x’s current doxastic state does not resolve the question yet; and (ii) every
proposition/doxastic state in x’s inquisitive state is one that does resolve the question.
Thus, Ciardelli & Roelofsen (2015) propose the analysis in (21a).11 We add here that
a sentence of the form x wonders ϕ presupposes that x believes the presuppositions
of ϕ to be true, as captured by (21b).
(21) a. Jx wonders ϕK = {{w | DOXwx 6∈ JϕK︸ ︷︷ ︸
x isn’t certain yet. . .
∧ INQwx ⊆ JϕK︸ ︷︷ ︸
but wants to find out
}}↓
b. presup(x wonders ϕ) = {w | DOXwx ⊆ presup(ϕ)}
To illustrate the predictions that this analysis makes, first consider the following
example, where the complement does not carry any presupposition.
(22) John wonders whether Ann left.
11 One attractive feature of this analysis is that it straightforwardly accounts for the fact that wonder does
not take declarative complements. Namely, the analysis predicts that combining the verb with such
a complement always yields a contradiction (Ciardelli & Roelofsen 2015, 2018). See also Uegaki











The semantic value of the complement, Jwhether Ann leftK, is the set of all proposi-
tions p such that either (i) all worlds in p are ones where Ann left, or (ii) all worlds
in p are ones where Ann didn’t leave, as was depicted in Figure 1(c). Therefore,
the semantic value of (22) as a whole is the set of all propositions consisting of
worlds w such that DOXwj 6∈ Jwhether Ann leftK and INQwj ⊆ Jwhether Ann leftK. The
first requirement is satisfied just in case DOXwj contains at least one world in which
Ann left and at least one world in which she didn’t leave, i.e., in case John doesn’t
know yet whether Ann left. The second requirement is satisfied just in case every
extension of John’s current doxastic state in which the issues that he entertains are
resolved is one in which he has come to know whether Ann left. This seems to be
precisely what is expressed by (22).
Now consider an example with a presuppositional complement:
(23) John wonders which girl left.
Suppose, as before, that the quantificational domain of the wh-phrase consists of
Ann and Betty. The predictions, then, are as follows. First, it is predicted that (23)
presupposes that John believes that exactly one of Ann and Betty left. Further, it is
predicted that the semantic value of (23) is the set of all propositions consisting of
worlds w such that DOXwj 6∈ Jwhich girl leftK and INQwj ⊆ Jwhich girl leftK. The first
requirement is satisfied just in case John doesn’t know yet which of the two girls left.
The second requirement is satisfied just in case every extension of John’s current
doxastic state in which the issues that he entertains are resolved is one in which he
has come to know which girl left.
2.5 Distributive ignorance is not captured
The baseline entries for believe and wonder given above do not predict DIIs. To see
this consider the following scenario.
(24) Scenario A crime has been committed, and there are three suspects: Ann,
Bill and Carol. Detective Jones is on the case, and has already ruled out that
Carol did it. However, he has not determined yet whether Ann or Bill did it.
In this scenario, consider sentences (1) and (2) from the introduction, repeated in
(25) and (26) below:
(25) The detective wonders whether Ann, Bill, or Carol did it.
(26) The detective believes that Ann, Bill, or Carol did it.
These sentences seem false in the given scenario, because Jones has already ruled
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show that this is indeed the majority judgment). However, our baseline entries for
believe and wonder predict the sentences to be true.
To see this, let us first explicate what Jones’ doxastic state and inquisitive state
are in the described scenario. For simplicity, let us assume that our logical space
consists of just four possible worlds, wA, wB, wC, and wE . In wA, Ann committed the
crime, in wB Bill did it, in wC Carol did it, and in wE the crime was not committed
by any of the current suspects but rather by someone else.
Jones’ information state, DOXwj , consists of those worlds in which either Ann or
Bill did it, i.e., DOXwj = {wA,wB}. This is depicted in Figure 2(a). On the other hand,
Jones’ inquisitive state, INQwj , consists of all extensions of his current information
state in which the issue that he entertains is resolved. These are the states {wA},
{wB}, and /0 (recall that it is assumed that the inconsistent information state, /0,









(c) whether A, B, or C
wA wB
wC wE
(d) that A, B, or C
Figure 2 Jones’ information state and inquisitive state in the scenario in (24),
and the meaning of the complements in (25) and (26). Recall that
inquisitive states and complement meanings are downward closed; only











Let us now turn to the complements in (25) and (26). The interrogative com-
plement in (25) expresses an issue whose resolution requires establishing which of
Ann, Bill, and Carol did it, presupposing that one of them did. Thus, as depicted in
Figure 2(c), its semantic value contains three alternatives, each corresponding to one
of the three disjuncts. On the other hand, the declarative complement in (26) conveys
the information that one of Ann, Bill, and Carol did it, and does not express an issue
requesting any further information. Thus, as depicted in Figure 2(d), its semantic
value contains a single alternative consisting of all worlds in which Ann, Bill, or
Carol did it.
The entry for believe predicts that (26) is true if and only if the following
requirement is met:
(27) DOXwj ∈ Jthat A, B, or CK
By inspecting Figures 2(a) and 2(d), it can be seen that this requirement is indeed
met. So (26) is incorrectly predicted to be true.
On the other hand, the entry for wonder predicts that (25) is true if and only if
the following requirements are met:
(28) a. DOXwj ⊆ {wA,wB,wC} (presupposition)
b. DOXwj 6∈ Jwhether A, B, or CK
c. INQwj ⊆ Jwhether A, B, or CK
By inspecting Figures 2(a)-2(c), it can be seen that these requirements are met as
well. So (25) is also incorrectly predicted to be true.
3 Toward a refined account: two parameters
There are various ways to refine the assumed baseline account of believe and wonder
so as to derive DIIs. Of course, the choice between these various options cannot be
made merely on the basis of the two simple example sentences we have considered
so far. Rather, to provide a richer testbed, we should investigate variants of these
basic cases as well. Before turning to this empirical investigation, however, we
should determine which kinds of constructions to look at exactly. This requires
a preliminary exploration of the various theoretical options. Thus, our aim in this
section will not be to spell out any particular theory in full detail, but rather to discuss
the main parameters that set the various approaches apart.
There are, as far as we can see, two main parameters, which we will label
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3.1 Structure-sensitivity
Compare the following two pairs of sentences.
(29) a. The detective wonders whether Ann, Bill, or Carol did it.
b. The detective wonders which of the suspects did it.
(30) a. The detective believes that Ann, Bill, or Carol did it.
b. The detective believes that one of the suspects did it.
Note that (29a) is a repetition of our initial example (1), and that (29b) is a variant of
it in which the verb takes a wh-question as its complement rather than an alternative
question. Similarly, (30a) is a repetition of our earlier example (2), and (30b) is a
variant of it in which the complement involves an existential quantifier rather than a
disjunction.
In the scenario under consideration, where the suspects are Ann, Bill, and Carol,
the two interrogative complements in (29a) and (29b) are semantically equivalent,
even though they are structurally different, and the same goes for (30a) and (30b).
The various possible refinements of our baseline account can be divided into ones
that are sensitive to such structural differences and ones that are not. Note that the
baseline account itself is not sensitive to the structure of the clauses that wonder
and believe take as their complement. According to the given entries, the verbs
only operate on the semantic content of their complement. Thus, in the absence
of any further assumptions, it is predicted that (29a) and (29b) are equivalent, and
similarly for (30a) and (30b). Importantly, this does not only hold for the baseline
account itself, but also for variants of it that remain insensitive to the structure
of the clauses that the verbs take as their complement. This includes any account
which derives DIIs as pragmatic implicatures and which assumes that the formal
alternatives that play a role in the computation of such implicatures are fully dictated
by the semantic content of the sentence under consideration and contextual factors
such as the question under discussion.12
An example of a structure-sensitive account would be one that derives DIIs as
pragmatic implicatures but does not assume that the relevant formal alternatives are
fully determined by semantic content and contextual factors such as the question
under discussion, but also depend on the structure of the sentence involved. A general
argument for such a structure-sensitive approach to computing implicatures has been
12 A terminological note: here and below, we use the term ‘formal alternatives’ for the expressions
that are taken into consideration when computing the implicatures of a given expression ϕ . These
formal alternatives are not to be confused with the maximal elements of JϕK, which are referred to
in inquisitive semantics and Hamblin semantics as the alternatives that ϕ introduces. Note that the
former are syntactic objects while the latter are semantic objects. When referring to the former kind











made by Katzir (2007). In particular, he proposes that the formal alternatives of a
sentence ϕ that are taken into account when computing implicatures are only those
sentences that can be obtained from ϕ either (i) by deleting elements in ϕ , or (ii)
by substituting elements in ϕ with other elements from an appropriately defined
source. Such an account would predict a difference in interpretation between (30a)
and (30b), as follows. In the case of (30a), pragmatic reasoning would involve the
formal alternatives in (31) below, which can all be obtained from (30a) by deleting
parts of it:
(31) a. The detective believes that Ann or Bill did it.
b. The detective believes that Ann or Carol did it.
c. The detective believes that Bill or Carol did it.
d. The detective believes that Ann did it.
e. The detective believes that Bill did it.
f. The detective believes that Carol did it.
These formal alternatives all entail (30a) itself. Thus, routine pragmatic reasoning
leads to the conclusion that, if a speaker utters (30a), he does not have enough
information to affirm any of the formal alternatives in (31), and if we further assume
that the speaker is knowledgeable about what the detective believes, we end up
deriving that none of the formal alternatives in (31) are true. This, in turn, implies
that the detective must still consider all of Ann, Bill, and Carol possible culprits.
Thus, the DII is accounted for.
In the case of (30b), on the other hand, this derivation does not get off the ground,
because the formal alternatives in (31) cannot be obtained from (30b) by deletion and
are therefore not taken into account when computing implicatures. Thus, it would be
predicted that (30b) does not imply distributive ignorance.
Roelofsen & Uegaki (2016) suggest, based on introspective judgments collected
from a small group of informants, that these predictions are correct: (30a) gives rise
to a DII, but (30b) does not. However, they also point out that it may in principle
be possible to account for this contrast under the assumption that the mechanism
responsible for DIIs is only sensitive to the semantic content of the complement
clause, and not (or at least not directly) to its syntactic structure. Namely, the fact
that a DII is absent in (30b) may be due to implicit domain restriction. For instance,
(30b) can perhaps be interpreted as follows:
(32) The detective believes that one of the [most likely] suspects did it.
Roelofsen & Uegaki (2016) discuss various challenges for such an account. Here, we
will focus on a particular empirical prediction, which, again in the absence of further
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This prediction concerns sentences like (33) and (34), which only differ from (29b)
and (30b), respectively, in that they involve the numeral three.
(33) The detective wonders which of the three suspects did it.
(34) The detective believes that one of the three suspects did it.
Geurts & van Tiel (2016) provide experimental evidence that implicit domain restric-
tion is very unlikely in partitive structures with a numeral, such as the wh-phrase in
(33) and the existential quantifier in (34). Thus, an account which assumes that DIIs
are not structure-sensitive and predicts a contrast between (29a) and (29b) based
on the possibility of domain restriction in (29b), predicts that (33), where domain
restriction is blocked by the numeral, will pattern with (29a) rather than with (29b).
That is, on such an account (33) is expected to give rise to a DII.
On the other hand, a structure-sensitive account of DIIs such as the one sketched
above, which predicts a contrast between (29a) and (29b) based on structural differ-
ences, leads us to expect, in the absence of further assumptions, that (33) will pattern
with (29b) rather than with (29a). That is, on such an account (33) is in principle
predicted not to give rise to a DII.
Roelofsen & Uegaki (2016) tentatively suggest, again based on introspective
judgments of a small group of informants, that (33) does give rise to DIIs. However,
the judgments were rather mixed in this case.
In our Experiment 1, to be discussed below, we tested the structure-sensitivity
of DIIs by comparing sentences involving four types of complements: disjunctive
complements (as in (29a)), quantificational complements whose domain is specified
by a noun phrase without a numeral (as in (29b)), quantificational complements
whose domain is specified by a noun phrase with a numeral (as in (33)), as well
as quantificational complements whose domain is listed explicitly by means of
a conjunction (as in The detective wonders which of Ann, Bill and Carol did it).
If DIIs are structure-sensitive, the latter are expected to pattern with disjunctive
complements.
3.2 Locality
We now turn to the second important parameter on which the various possible
refinements of the assumed baseline account would differ. To see what this amounts
to, consider the following scenario:13
(35) There is a crime with three suspects, Ann, Bill, and Carol. There are three
detectives investigating the case.











- Detective 1 still considers Bill and Carol possible culprits, but not Ann.
- Detective 2 still considers Ann and Carol possible culprits, but not
Bill.
- Detective 3 still considers Ann and Bill possible culprits, but not Carol.
In this scenario, consider the following two sentences:
(36) Every detective is wondering whether Ann, Bill, or Carol did it.
(37) Every detective believes that Ann, Bill, or Carol did it.
Note that these are variants of our initial examples (1) and (2) in which the subject
is a universal quantifier rather than a referential expression. Consider the structure-
sensitive account of DIIs as pragmatic implicatures outlined above. When we apply
this account to (37), the following implicatures are derived:
(38) It is not the case that every detective believes. . .
a. . . . that Ann or Bill did it.
b. . . . that Ann or Carol did it.
c. . . . that Bill or Carol did it.
d. . . . that Ann did it.
e. . . . that Bill did it.
f. . . . that Carol did it.
These implicatures are all true in the given scenario, and the same holds for the
literal meaning of the sentence according to our baseline entry. Thus, the sentence is
predicted to be true, even though in the given scenario all the detectives have already
ruled out one of the suspects, so none of them is distributively ignorant.
Besides pragmatic theories which predict that the literal interpretation of an
utterance may be strengthened through reasoning about formal alternatives of the
uttered sentence as a whole, there are also theories which predict that the meaning
of any part of a given sentence may be strengthened through comparison with
formal alternatives, and that this strengthened meaning may then serve as input to
operators that apply to this part of the sentence, all within the process of composing
the semantic content of the sentence, before pragmatic reasoning enters the stage
(see, e.g., Chierchia et al. 2012). This process of strengthening through comparison
with formal alternatives is referred to as exhaustification.
Thus, while pragmatic reasoning can only have a ‘global’ effect on the inter-
pretation of a sentence as a whole, exhaustification as conceived by Chierchia et al.
(2012) and others can also have a ‘local’ effect, on parts of a sentence. For instance,
if exhaustification is applied to the verb phrase in (37), before the universal quantifier
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(39) Every detective is such that it is not the case that she believes. . .
a. . . . that Ann or Bill did it.
b. . . . that Ann or Carol did it.
c. . . . that Bill or Carol did it.
d. . . . that Ann did it.
e. . . . that Bill did it.
f. . . . that Carol did it.
Notice that the first three implications are false in the given scenario. Thus, on
an account which assumes that the meaning of the verb phrase in (37) is obligatorily
strengthened through exhaustification, the sentence is predicted to be false, unlike
on the pragmatic account considered above. More specifically, under the assumption
that local exhaustification is obligatory, (37) is only true in situations in which every
detective is distributively ignorant. On the other hand, if exhaustification of the verb
phrase is only considered optional, then (37) is predicted to have two readings: one
under which it is true in the given scenario (without local exhaustification), and one
under which it is false (with local exhaustification).
Which of these two readings is preferred could then be taken to depend on prag-
matic factors (Chierchia et al. 2012, Potts et al. 2016). In particular, Chierchia et al.
(2012) suggest that some version of Dalrymple et al.’s (1998) Strongest Meaning
Hypothesis plays an important role in determining such preferences. According to
this suggestion, other things being equal, a reading involving local exhaustification
is preferred if it is stronger than the reading obtained without local exhaustifica-
tion, and dispreferred if it is weaker than that reading. Thus, in the case of (37)
for instance, the reading with local exhaustification would be preferred, since it is
stronger than the one without. However, if the quantifier in subject position were
downward entailing rather than upward entailing (e.g., no detective rather than every
detective) the reading without local exhaustification would in principle be preferred.
Finally, if the quantifier is non-monotonic (e.g., exactly two detectives), local ex-
haustification makes the reading neither stronger nor weaker. This means that the
Strongest Meaning Hypothesis typically does not constrain local exhaustification
under non-monotonic quantifiers.
Let us now take a step back. Given the considerations above, the various possible
refinements of our baseline account that derive the DIIs of (1) and (2) through
comparison with formal alternatives can be of three types: they could assume that
such comparison (i) only happens globally, (ii) optionally happens locally as well, or
(iii) obligatorily happens locally. The latter type of theory can be implemented, for
instance, by incorporating an exhaustification operator in the lexical semantics of the













Only global strengthening Approach 1 Approach 4
Optional local strengthening Approach 2 Approach 5
Obligatory local strengthening Approach 3 Approach 6
Table 1 Overview of possible theoretical approaches.
Combining the two parameters we have considered, structure-sensitivity and
locality, we can distinguish six general theoretical approaches, as indicated in Table 1.
In the following two sections, we will report the results of two experiments that
were aimed to determine which of these general approaches is most adequate. This
is done by considering variants of our basic examples in which the structure of the
complement clause is different (Experiment 1), and ones involving different kinds of
quantificational subjects (Experiment 2). The former should allow us to tease apart
structure-sensitive approaches from structure-insensitive ones. The latter should
allow us to distinguish between approaches that assume only global strengthening,
and ones that assume optional or obligatory local strengthening through comparison
with formal alternatives.
We should note that we are not presupposing at this point that one and the same
approach is most fitting to account for DIIs of both wonder and believe. In fact, in
Roelofsen & Uegaki (2016: footnote 5) it was explicitly suggested that Approach
3 in Table 1 is most appropriate for wonder, while Approach 1 is most suitable
for believe. Anticipating what is to come, the results of our experiments refute this
hypothesis and suggest instead that Approach 2 is most adequate for both wonder
and believe.
4 First experiment: complements
4.1 Goal
The goal of our first experiment was to compare the DIIs with wonder and believe,
and to investigate the potential contrast illustrated in (29) and (30). In particular,
we wanted to test the claim made by Roelofsen & Uegaki (2016) that there is a
contrast between, on the one hand, disjunctive complements (‘whether/that A, B, or
C’) and complements whose domain is explicitly listed by means of a conjunction
over individuals (‘which/one of A, B, and C’) and, on the other hand, complements
whose domain is not explicitly listed (‘which/one of the suspects’). Another case of
interest discussed in §3.1 is that of numerals. Since it is known that numerals in the
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(Geurts & van Tiel 2016), we wanted to see whether the presence of numerals would
affect the judgments concerning DIIs.
4.2 Design
Participants were recruited on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and took a survey directly
on the platform. The survey consisted of the context in (40) and three sentences they
had to judge. Each sentence was followed by the question “In this context, would
you say that this sentence is true or false?” and a 7-point scale, the extreme points of
which were labeled ‘Clearly false’ and ‘Clearly true’. These three sentences were
followed by two demographic questions, asking for participants’ age and native
language (a text field that participants could fill in freely). The whole survey was
presented on a single page.
(40) Context: Sue has three children, Sophie, Bill, and Mary, who all live on
their own. Sue is impatiently waiting for all of them to arrive at her place
for Thanksgiving dinner. Someone rings the bell. Sue isn’t sure who it is,
but she knows that it can’t be Bill, because he just texted her that he would
be late.
We recruited a relatively high number of participants (384) but kept the number of
items per participant low, for the following reasons. First, presenting more items
to each participant would have involved introducing multiple background stories,
which would have made the survey more tedious and possibly confusing. Moreover,
by keeping the number of items per participant low we obtained a good view
of individual differences, and each participant was more naive to the goal of the
experiment. Finally, having an order of magnitude more participants than in usual
psycholinguistic experiments also has the advantage of facilitating the convergence
of complex mixed-effects models (see Phillips & George 2018 for a similar method
applied to the no-false-beliefs inference of embedded mention-some questions).
Eight different surveys were designed, corresponding to the eight possible target
sentences obtained by combinations of the following two factors: embedding VERB
(‘wonder’ or ‘believe’) and COMPLEMENT type (disjunction, conjunction, NP,
NumP). Each survey version had 3 sentences (one for each CONDITION: Target, True
control, and False control), which were presented in random order. Target sentences
were literally true, but their DII was false in the given context. This way, we could
test whether participants had derived the inference by measuring how unacceptable
the target was for them. The target sentences for each combination are listed in
Table 2. The True sentences were derived by dropping Bill from the disjunction and
conjunction, and replacing ‘children’ or ‘three children’ with ‘daughters’ (this way,











types, and involved ‘whether Bill arrived’ and ‘that Bill arrived’ for wonder and
believe respectively.
COMPLEMENT VERB Target sentence
Disjunction
believe Sue believes that Sophie, Bill, or Mary arrived.
wonder Sue wonders whether Sophie, Bill, or Mary arrived.
Conjunction
believe Sue believes that one of Sophie, Bill, and Mary arrived.
wonder Sue wonders which of Sophie, Bill, and Mary arrived.
NP
believe Sue believes that one of her children arrived.
wonder Sue wonders which of her children arrived.
NumP
believe Sue believes that one of her three children arrived.
wonder Sue wonders which of her three children arrived.
Table 2 Target sentences by COMPLEMENT and VERB.
4.3 Participants
For each survey version, we recruited eight participants for each of the six possible
orders for the Target, True and False sentences (hence a total of 384 HITs were
posted on Mechanical Turk, paid 27¢ each). Despite requesting that participants
take the survey only once (and enforcing this with the UniqueTurker script), a few
participants took multiple surveys. Three participants who took the survey 5 or more
times were not paid for their retakes and their HITs were offered to new participants.
All other participants were paid for all their retakes, but the corresponding data were
discarded from the analyses. The data from 10 participants who reported native
languages other than English were discarded as well.
In all, after removing all retakes and non-native speakers, we had data from 326
unique native English speakers (age range: 19–70).
4.4 Results
Anonymized data and analysis scripts for all experiments reported in this paper can
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Disjunction:
that/whether A, B, or C
Conjunction:




one/which of the three NP



















Figure 3 Experiment 1: Acceptability for each Verb, Complement, and Sentence
(boxes indicate median and quartiles, each dot represents an individual
answer).
The results are presented in Figure 3. Notice that DIIs are most visible with
Disjunction and Conjunction COMPLEMENTS (as indicated by maximal difference
between Targets and True controls), and seem to be completely absent with NP and
NumP under believe.
We ran a mixed-effects ordinal logistic regression on the responses to the True
and Target sentences with VERB (sum-coded), COMPLEMENT (baseline: Disjunc-
tive), CONDITION (baseline: True) and all their interactions as fixed effects, and
a random Subject intercept (in R, using package ordinal, R Core Team 2014,
Christensen 2015). The full results are presented in Table 3. The highly significant
effect of CONDITION confirms that Disjunction — the baseline for COMPLEMENT
— gives rise to DIIs, and the absence of a CONDITION×VERB interaction indi-
cated that this effect is similar for wonder and believe. That CONDITION interacts
with COMPLEMENT on its NP and NumP levels shows that the DIIs have a very
reduced effect with these two complements, although the triple interactions CONDI-
TION×VERB×COMPLEMENT indicate that unlike believe, wonder still gives rise to
DIIs with these complements.
Model comparisons showed that there was no significant difference between the












CONDITION -4.49 -11.8 < 0.001 ???
VERB -0.01 -0.02 0.985
[COMP:Conjunction] 0.55 1.5 0.131
[COMP:NP] -0.05 -0.1 0.888
[COMP:NumP] 0.02 0.07 0.947
CONDITION×VERB 0.22 0.4 0.718
CONDITION×[COMP:Conjunction] 0.68 1.5 0.140
CONDITION×[COMP:NP] 3.65 7.8 < 0.001 ???
CONDITION×[COMP:NumP] 3.15 6.7 < 0.001 ???
VERB×[COMP:Conjunction] 0.37 0.5 0.610
VERB×[COMP:NP] 0.83 1.3 0.210
VERB×[COMP:NumP] 1.57 2.3 0.022 ?
CONDITION×VERB×[COMP:Conjunction] -1.51 -1.7 0.098
CONDITION×VERB×[COMP:NP] -1.75 -2.0 0.041 ?
CONDITION×VERB×[COMP:NumP] -2.90 -3.3 < 0.001 ???
Table 3 Experiment 1: Results of the ordinal mixed-effects model on True
and Target sentences. Factors of theoretical interest are highlighted for
readability. The standard deviation of the random intercepts was .49.
Significance levels: .05 (?), .01 (??), .001 (???).
4.5 Replications with different contexts
The experiment presented above involved only one context and the results we
obtained may partly depend on certain features of this context. To address this issue,
we ran two follow-up experiments with different contexts. We also made some
small changes to the design. First, the VERB factor was made within-subject, so
each participant saw two targets, two true controls and two false controls (one for
each verb). Second, we added two fillers, one clearly true and one clearly false,
bringing the total number of items a participant saw to eight (from three in the
original experiment).
Details about these two follow-up experiments can be found in Appendix A. The
key result was replicated (DIIs with disjunctive and conjunctive complements, but
not with NP complements). However, in both experiments we observed a difference
between NP and NumP complements. In one case, the NumP complements gave rise
to DIIs as strong as disjunctive and conjunctive complements, and in the other case,
it was somewhere in between. Furthermore, the effect of VERB on NumP targets
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4.6 Discussion
First, we observed clear differences between the various complements. More specif-
ically, the two complements which mentioned each alternative (Disjunction and
Conjunction) showed much stronger DIIs than the noun phrase complement. This is
in line with the hypothesis that structurally determined formal alternatives play an
important role (Katzir 2007, Fox & Katzir 2011), and that mentioned alternatives
are strongly activated, as argued in various empirical domains (see e.g., Onea &
Steinbach 2012, Starr 2014 for the role of mentioned alternatives in conditionals;
Roelofsen et al. 2016 in embedded questions; Coppock & Brochhagen 2013 in
modified numerals, and Csipak & Zobel 2014, Rojas-Esponda 2014 in discourse
particles.)
Second, we only found small differences between wonder and believe, and these
differences were not replicated in the follow-up experiments. Crucially, there was
no difference at all between the two verbs in the Disjunction condition, where the
strongest DIIs were observed.14
Finally, the addition of a numeral had very different effects in the different
contexts we tested. In the original experiment, it had no effect with believe and
if anything, only slightly strengthened DIIs with wonder. In the follow-ups it had
a stronger effect, with both verbs. The finding that NumP did not pattern with
Disjunction/Conjunction across contexts is important in view of the role of implicit
domain restriction. Although the contrast between Disjunction/Conjunction and
NP could in principle be explained in terms of the possibility of implicit domain
restriction in the latter, this explanation is implausible in the case of NumP, given
that implicit domain restriction is highly unlikely with a numeral (Geurts & van
Tiel 2016).15 To sum up, the addition of a numeral can make DIIs as strong as with
14 Note that the three other complements do not offer as minimal a comparison as Disjunction, because
they involve ‘which of X . . . ’ with wonder but ‘that one of X . . . ’ with believe. This could have
affected the results in two ways. First, it opens the possibility of a specific reading with believe if
‘one’ somehow gets wide scope. When designing the experiment, we tried to block this reading as
much as possible by making clear that Sue doesn’t know which of her daughters will arrive first,
but the fact that true controls received a slightly lower rating with believe than with wonder could
indicate that some participants still had the specific reading. Second, it may be that which activates
domain alternatives in a way that one does not. This could lead to stronger DIIs with ‘wonders which
of’ than with ‘believes that one of’.
15 There is one subtlety to note here: strictly speaking, Geurts & van Tiel (2016) show that numerals
block domain restriction only in the case of non-intersective quantifiers (i.e. quantifiers Q such that
the truth-conditions of “Q A B” are not entirely determined by A∩B). It is not straightforward to
say whether or not wh-phrases like which of her children are intersective in the relevant sense. In
particular, interpreting the question that a wh-phrase is part of as strongly exhaustive or weakly











disjunctions or completely absent; its effect depends on the context and sometimes
on the embedding verb.
At this point, the results favor an approach that is structure-sensitive (§3.1),
but they do not tell us anything yet about locality (§3.2) since all sentences had
non-quantificational subjects. In the next experiment, we will focus on disjunctive
complements, which offer both the most minimal comparison between believe and
wonder and exhibit the strongest DII effects, and we will test how DIIs project from
the scope of various quantified subjects.
5 Second experiment: quantified subjects
5.1 Goal
The goal of the second experiment was to investigate the projection of DIIs under
quantified subjects. In principle, DIIs could always be computed globally, always
locally, or sometimes locally and sometimes globally. In §5.2 we provide some
empirical and theoretical background on local strengthening.
Note that the DIIs of wonder and believe could in principle give rise to different
projection patterns in quantified cases. This would suggest that the DIIs of the
two verbs are of a different nature and require separate treatment, as suggested in
Roelofsen & Uegaki (2016).
5.2 Background on local strengthening
Chierchia (2004) argued that scalar implicatures — most notably the implicature
from some to ‘not all’ — are sometimes computed locally (in the scope of quanti-
fiers, negation, modals, etc.). He proposed that such local implicatures are due to a
silent exhaustification operator which can be freely inserted in embedded positions.
This proposal was met with strong criticism; see in particular Horn (2006) and
Geurts (2009) for re-evaluations of Chierchia’s original motivating examples in a
Neo-Gricean framework. New arguments for Chierchia’s proposal were offered in
Chierchia et al. (2009, 2012).
Most importantly for us, this debate moved to experimental grounds with the
publication of Geurts & Pouscoulous (2009). In this study, the authors tested the
availability of local exhaustification readings using a sentence-picture verification
task. While they did not find any evidence for such readings, this sparked a flurry of
experimental work using various methods, and there is now a rather broad consensus
that these readings are in fact available (Clifton & Dube 2010, Chemla & Spector
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As a consequence, the debate has now moved from a dispute over the facts to a
debate on how these facts should be accounted for. While Geurts & van Tiel (2013)
maintain a pragmatic account complemented with a mechanism of truth-conditional
narrowing which requires narrow focus, proponents of the grammatical theory main-
tain that local readings are derived by insertion of an embedded exhaustification
operator. Finally, Bergen et al. (2016) propose an account based on lexical ambiguity
for some and other lexical items (equivalent to the possibility of local exhaustifica-
tion) and probabilistic Gricean style reasoning to resolve ambiguities (see Potts et al.
2016 for experimental evaluation of this model).
One thing that has become clear about the availability of local strengthening is
that it greatly depends on the monotonicity of the embedding operator. Its availability
in upward-entailing environments (e.g., under every) varies quite a bit from one
experiment to the next. On the other hand, it tends to be low in downward-entailing
environments (e.g., under no), and high under non-monotonic quantifiers such as
exactly n.16
5.3 Design
In this experiment, we followed Roelofsen & Uegaki (2016) and the literature on
local strengthening in testing the quantifiers every, no and exactly n. We did however
stick to the experimental paradigm of Experiment 1 where sentences were judged
against a context given by short vignettes, since the sentence-picture verification
tasks that are often used in the literature on local strengthening are not well suited to
test attitude reports.
We focused on disjunctive complements, which made DIIs easiest to detect,
and tested three quantifiers as subject: every (upward-entailing), no (downward-
entailing), and exactly two (non-monotonic). Six different surveys were designed,
corresponding to the six combinations of VERB (wonder or believe) and subject
QUANTIFIER (every, no, exactly two). As in Experiment 1, each survey involved a
context, followed by a Target sentence, a True control sentence, and a False control
sentence which were presented in random order.
We designed contexts which would make local and global DIIs come apart
for each of the quantifiers. The context used in Experiment 1 would not have
translated very well with quantified subjects, so we moved to contexts with detectives,
which also happened to be closer to the examples of Roelofsen & Uegaki (2016).
Context (41) below was used for every and no, while context (42) was used for
16 van Tiel et al. (2018) identify a number of low-level factors that may have affected the results of the
various experiments that have been carried out and may partly explain the differences found among
these results (e.g., the length of the experiment, the presence of the scalar alternatives in filler items,











exactly two. Since the contexts became more complex, we made a few changes
intended to help participants process the information given to them. First, we used
colors to identify each suspect, so it was easier to retrieve the relevant piece of
information in the context if a participant forgot what each detective knows about
each person (remember that this was a one-page survey so the background story
remained on screen). Second, we did not give all suspects a name (which would be
difficult for participants to keep track of) but rather identified them in terms of their
occupations (the butler, the gardener, et cetera).
(41) Every/no Context: The rich lord Edgware has been murdered, and three
detectives are investigating the case independently. The suspects are four
people working for the lord: his butler, his gardener, his maid, and his cook.
Every detective quickly established that the gardener is innocent. The first
detective further established that the maid cannot be the culprit, while the
two other detectives gathered evidence showing that it cannot be the cook.
No detective is aware of the others’ discoveries, so the first detective still
considers the cook as a suspect, and the two others still consider the maid
as a suspect.
(42) Exactly two Context: The rich lord Edgware has been murdered, and three
detectives are investigating the case independently. The suspects are four
people working for the lord: his butler, his gardener, his maid, and his
cook. Every detective quickly established that the gardener is innocent. The
first detective further established that the maid cannot be the culprit. No
detective is aware of the others’ discoveries, so two of them still consider
the maid as a suspect.
The crucial information in the two contexts is summarized in Table 4. Note that
we did not use the context given in (35) because we wanted to make sure that the
different detectives’ beliefs would not contradict each other (there is at least one
suspect that could be the murderer according to all of them), and that there was one
suspect that had been cleared by all detectives (this was useful for control items).
The False, Target, and True test sentences for wonder are presented in (43a-45a),
(43b-45b), and (43c-45c) respectively. For the targets, we indicate what the local
and global DII amount to in each case.
(43) Every-wonder sentences:
a. Every detective wonders whether or not the cook committed the crime.
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(i) Global DII: Every detective still wonders which suspect com-
mitted the crime, and none of the three mentioned suspects has
been cleared by all detectives.
(ii) Local DII: None of the three mentioned suspects has been cleared
by any detective.
c. Every detective wonders whether or not the butler committed the crime.
(44) No-wonder sentences:
a. No detective wonders whether or not the maid committed the crime.
b. No detective wonders whether the maid, the cook, or the butler com-
mitted the crime.
(i) Literal reading:17 Every detective figured out who committed
the crime.
(ii) Local DII: Every detective either figured out who committed the
crime, or still considers all the three mentioned suspects.
c. No detective wonders whether or not the gardener committed the
crime.
(45) Exactly two-wonder sentences:
a. Exactly two detectives wonder whether or not the gardener committed
the crime.
b. Exactly two detectives wonder whether the maid, the cook, or the
butler committed the crime.
17 Note that in this case global strengthening is vacuous. The literal reading we predict is in fact
disjunctive: every detective either knows already who committed the crime or doesn’t want to know.
Given the context, we can rule out the second disjunct (assuming every detective is in fact interested
in solving the case).
butler gardener maid cook
(41)
D1 suspect innocent innocent suspect
D2 suspect innocent suspect innocent
D3 suspect innocent suspect innocent
(42)
D1 suspect innocent innocent suspect
D2 suspect innocent suspect suspect
D3 suspect innocent suspect suspect
Table 4 Summary of the situation in the two contexts. For each detective, it is
indicated who they consider to be innocent and who they still consider











(i) Global DII: Exactly two detectives haven’t figured out who com-
mitted the crime yet, and none of the three mentioned suspects
has been cleared by both of these two detectives.
(ii) Local DII: Exactly two detectives still consider all the three
mentioned suspects, while the third detective has ruled out at
least one of them.
c. Exactly two detectives wonder whether or not the maid committed the
crime.
The judgment for each target item in its respective context depended on whether a
DII was derived locally, globally, or not derived at all. However, the exact mapping
varied: the every target (43b) was true with a global or no DII, and false with a local
DII, while the no and the exactly two targets (44b, 45b) were false with a global or
no DII, and true with a local DII. Note that this means the experiment was not able
to differentiate between a global DII and no DII at all.
The target believe sentences were identical to the target wonder sentences, except
that wonders whether was replaced by believes that. True and False controls involved
a few more replacements. Examples are given in (46).
(46) Example of believe sentences. Differences with wonder highlighted in
boldface.
a. Exactly two-believe; False: Exactly two detective believe that the
gardener may have committed the crime.
b. Every-believe; Target: Every detective believes that the maid, the
cook, or the butler committed the crime.
c. No-believe; True: No detective believes that the gardener may have
committed the crime.
5.4 Participants
For each survey version, we recruited 16 participants for each of the six possible
orders for the Target, True and False sentences (hence a total of 576 HITs were
posted on Mechanical Turk, paid 30ct each). Again, a few participants managed
to take multiple surveys. All retakes were discarded from the analysis, and two
participants who took the survey 5 or more times were not paid for their retakes
and their HITs were offered to new participants. The data from 9 participants who
reported native languages other than English were also discarded.
In all, after removing all retakes and non-native speakers, we had data from 543
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5.5 Results
Every No Exactly



















Figure 4 Experiment 2: Acceptability for each Verb, Complement, and Sentence
(boxes indicate median and quartiles, each dot represents an individual
answer).
The results are presented in Figure 4. Since Target sentences varied as to which
readings they made true or false depending on quantifiers, we could not simply
compare True and Target sentences across quantifiers. Instead of CONDITION, we
defined two factors which had a consistent interpretation across QUANTIFIERS.
BASELINE had value 0 on all False sentences and 1 on all True sentences, so it
measured the maximum acceptability. The second factor, LOCAL, encoded the
effect of local DIIs on acceptability. It had value 0 on all True and False sentences,
where the truth of the local DII reading matched the truth of the literal and global
DII readings and therefore had no effect. The value of the BASELINE and LOCAL
predictors on Targets depended on the quantifier, as illustrated in Figure 5.
The Every Target was true under a global DII reading or in the absence of a DII,
and false under a local DII reading. Therefore, the effect of local DIIs here was to
reduce the acceptability compared to the True sentence, so the two factors were fixed
at BASELINE = 1 and LOCAL =−1. As a result, the model predicted an increase in
acceptability of (βBASELINE−βLOCAL) compared to False controls (on the logit scale,
modulo other predictors).
No and Exactly two Targets were false under a global DII reading or in the
absence of DII, and true under a local DII reading. Therefore, the effect of local
DIIs was to increase acceptability compared to the False sentence. The values of







































































False Target True False Target True
BASELINE 0 1 1 0 0 1
LOCAL 0 −1 0 0 1 0
Predicted value 0 βBase−βLocal βBase 0 βLocal βBase
Figure 5 This figure illustrates how we detected local DIIs in the model for
Experiment 2. Every targets are true except under a local DII reading,
while no and exactly targets are true only under a local DII reading. The
predicted value corresponds to the estimated position of each sentence
on the logit scale (ignoring other factors).
model predicted an increase in acceptability of βLOCAL compared to False controls.
To sum up, the factor BASELINE always encoded the difference between True and
False sentences, while LOCAL encoded the difference between True and Target for
every, and the difference between Target and False for no and exactly two. Using
these factors, we fitted a mixed-effects ordinal logistic regression to all responses,
the details and results of which are described in Table 5.
We observed that LOCAL had a significant effect with baseline quantifier every,
and that its effect was stronger with exactly two and weaker with no. Crucially,
LOCAL did not interact with Verb at all (model comparison: χ2(3) = 4.6, p = .21).
As a post-hoc analysis we fitted a model to No items only, which showed that LOCAL
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β z-value p
BASELINE 3.6 13.1 < .001 ???
LOCAL 2.4 10.6 < .001 ???
VERB 1.3 3.5 < .001 ???
[QUANT:no] -0.2 -0.9 0.390
[QUANT:exactly] -1.2 -3.7 < .001 ???
BASELINE×VERB -1.0 -2.2 0.030 ?
LOCAL×VERB 0.4 1.1 0.280
BASELINE×[QUANT:no] 1.2 3.5 0.001 ???
BASELINE×[QUANT:exactly] 1.8 4.5 < .001 ???
LOCAL×[QUANT:no] -1.9 -5.6 < .001 ???
LOCAL×[QUANT:exactly] 1.8 4.7 < .001 ???
VERB×[QUANT:no] -1.8 -3.4 0.001 ???
VERB×[QUANT:exactly] -1.7 -2.6 0.010 ??
BASELINE×VERB×[QUANT:no] 1.4 2.0 0.049 ?
BASELINE×VERB×[QUANT:exactly] 2.2 2.8 0.005 ??
LOCAL×VERB×[QUANT:no] .002 .002 0.998
LOCAL×VERB×[QUANT:exactly] 0.5 0.7 0.467
Table 5 Experiment 2: Full results of the statistical model. Factors of
theoretical interest are highlighted for readability. Model struc-
ture: Answer ∼ (Baseline + Local)*Verb*Quantifier + (1 +
Baseline|Subject). The standard deviation of the random effects
was .52 for the intercept and .58 for the slope. Significance levels: .05
(?), .01 (??), .001 (???)
5.6 Replications with different contexts
As with the previous experiment, one may worry that our results were affected by
the specific scenario we used. This is particularly relevant in Experiment 2, since
ignorance may be treated differently in the context of a murder investigation than in
everyday situations. To address this issue, we carried out a follow-up experiment
with two new contexts. The details of this follow-up experiment can be found in
Appendix B. Overall, the results were very similar. In particular, local DIIs were
present under every, and even more so under exactly. They were completely absent
under no, unlike in the original experiment where we did detect a small effect of
local DIIs under no. Finally, we observed no significant differences between wonder












In Experiment 2 we investigated the projection behavior of DIIs in quantified sen-
tences. We observed three things: first, DIIs are sometimes computed locally in the
scope of quantified subjects. Second, there was variability across quantifiers: local
DIIs were more frequently computed under exactly n than under every, and less
frequently, if at all, under no. Finally, there was no observable difference between
wonder and believe in the amount of local DIIs they give rise to.
Going back to Table 1 on page 20, the first result tells us that we can rule out the
first line (only global strengthening), while the second result eliminates the last line
(only local strengthening). Finally, the third result indicates that there is no reason to
postulate different mechanisms for the derivation of DIIs with believe and wonder.
The pattern we observed with the various quantifiers is quite similar to what has
been observed in previous experimental work on local strengthening (in particular
Chemla & Spector 2011, Potts et al. 2016). In these studies, the scalar item some was
sometimes interpreted as ‘some but not all’ in the scope of every, more frequently
so in the scope of exactly n, but less so in the scope of no. One key difference is
that our overall results offer no clear evidence for local strengthening under no,
while some does occasionally receive a ‘some but not all’ interpretation under no.
Of course, there are clear differences between the design of our experiment and the
sentence-picture verification task used to test local strengthening of some, which
may be responsible for this contrast (especially given the effect of small variations
in design found by van Tiel et al. 2018).
6 General discussion
6.1 Discussion of the two experiments
The two experiments discussed in the previous sections were conducted with the goal
to investigate the nature of DIIs with respect to two parameters: structure-sensitivity
and locality. More specifically, Experiment 1 tested the strength of DIIs with different
kinds of complements. Experiment 2, on the other hand, investigated the interaction
between DIIs and quantifiers with different monotonicity properties. Furthermore,
since both experiments tested DIIs under believe and wonder, the results inform us
as to whether we should aim for a unified account of DIIs under believe and wonder,
or rather for a lexically-specific account.
The results of Experiment 1 indicate that DIIs depend on the structure of the com-
plement. Concretely, DIIs are significantly stronger with Disjunction/Conjunction
complements (e.g., whether/that Sophie, Bill, or Mary arrived and which/one of
Sophie, Bill, and Mary arrived) than with NP/NumP complements (e.g., which/one
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mechanism that gives rise to DIIs is structure-sensitive. In this regard, we concur
with Roelofsen & Uegaki (2016), who arrived at the same conclusion based on
introspective judgments from a small group of informants (although our results
suggest that the contrast between NP and NumP complements reported by Roelofsen
& Uegaki 2016 is not robust across different contexts).
The results of Experiment 2 indicate that DIIs can arise locally in the scope
of subject quantifiers, and furthermore that the presence of local DIIs depends on
the monotonicity properties of the quantifier. Specifically, local DIIs are observed
under every, and even more strongly under exactly two but they are absent under
no, a pattern which is similar to that found in previous experimental work on the
local strengthening of scalar items like some and or (Chemla & Spector 2011,
Potts et al. 2016). These results point to the conclusion that DIIs arise from a
strengthening mechanism that is optionally local. Obligatory global strengthening
would not capture the DII effects under every and exactly two while obligatory local
strengthening would not capture the absence of DIIs under no. These results are
incompatible with Roelofsen & Uegaki’s (2016) analysis of DIIs, which incorporates
an exhaustification operator in the lexical semantics of wonder (predicting obligatory
local strengthening).
Furthermore, in view of the general similarity between wonder and believe in
our results, the most parsimonious account would be one which assumes a single
strengthening mechanism that is responsible for DIIs with both wonder and believe,
rather than positing verb-specific mechanisms. It should be noted that we did find
a small but significant difference between wonder and believe with NP/NumP
complements in Experiment 1. However, as discussed in §4.6, it is possible that this
was caused by differences between the complements involved (i.e., which of... vs.
that one of...), and not by the verbs themselves. Furthermore, the relevant differences
were not observed in the replication of Experiment 1 (cf. Appendix A).
Taken together, the results of our experiments point to the conclusion that the
best approach to DIIs is one based on a structure-sensitive strengthening mechanism
that optionally applies locally (i.e. Approach 2 in Table 1 on page 20). Moreover,
the most parsimonious account would be one that derives DIIs triggered by wonder
and believe in a unified way.
6.2 A possible implementation
In this section, we outline an account of DIIs that captures their structure sensitivity
and optional locality. Specifically, such an account of DIIs can be implemented
by employing a covert exhaustivity operator, which can be optionally inserted at
any sentential node in a structure, modulo pragmatic considerations (Chierchia











framework of inquisitive semantics, and illustrate how it derives DIIs with believe
and wonder. Note that the goal of this section is to demonstrate that it is possible to
have a concrete analysis of DIIs consistent with the structure-sensitivity and optional
locality observed in our experimental results, rather than to argue that the specific
implementation provided here is more advantageous than other accounts capturing
the same characteristics of DIIs.
The exhaustivity operator EXH can be defined as in (47) within the current
framework, where IEΨ(ϕ) picks out those elements of the set of formal alternatives
Ψ that are ‘innocently excludable’ (Fox 2007), as defined in (48). Here, we only
define EXH with respect to a non-inquisitive prejacent for the sake of simplicity, as





∣∣∣∣ w ∈ info(ϕ) and∀ψ ∈ IEΨ(ϕ) : w 6∈ info(ψ)
}}↓
b. presup(EXHΨ(ϕ)) = presup(ϕ)




∣∣∣∣ ψ is contained in every maximal set Ψ′ ⊆Ψsuch that {¬χ | χ ∈Ψ′}∪{ϕ} is consistent
}
The structure-sensitivity of exhaustivity is guaranteed by restricting the set of for-
mal alternatives for exhaustification to those that are structurally simpler than the
prejacent, following Katzir (2007):
(49) Structurally determined formal alternatives (Katzir 2007)
ALT(ϕ) := {ψ | ψ . ϕ}
where ψ . ϕ iff ϕ can be transformed into ψ by a finite series of deletions,
contractions, and replacements of constituents in ϕ with constituents of the
same category taken from the lexicon or the set of subtrees of ϕ .
Given this setup, we can account for the pattern of DIIs observed in our experiments.
First, a non-quantified sentence with believe can have the following LF:
(50) EXHΨ [x believes that Ann, Bill, or Carol did it].
This LF has the interpretation shown below, assuming that the set Ψ is restricted to
the structural alternatives of the prejacent, i.e., ALT(x believes that A, B, or C)):




















w ∈ info(x believes that A, B, or C)
& w 6∈ info(x believes that A or B)
& w 6∈ info(x believes that B or C)
& w 6∈ info(x believes that A or C)
& w 6∈ info(x believes that A)
& w 6∈ info(x believes that B)




This interpretation captures the DII, i.e., that x is ignorant about each of A, B,
and C. To see this, first suppose that x believes that A in w. This is incompatible
with the conjunct w 6∈ info(x believes that A). Now suppose that x believes not-
A in w. Then, the prejacent w ∈ info(x believes that A, B or C) is satisfied only if
w∈ info(x believes that B or C), but this contradicts the conjunct w 6∈ info(x believes
that B or C). Ignorance as to B and C follows in the same manner.
Similarly, in the case of wonder, we have the following LF and interpretation:
(52) EXHΨ [x wonders whether A, B, or C]











w ∈ info(x wonders whether A, B, or C)
& w 6∈ info(x wonders whether A or B)
& w 6∈ info(x wonders whether B or C)
& w 6∈ info(x wonders whether A or C)
& w 6∈ info(x wonders whether A)
& w 6∈ info(x wonders whether B)




Again, the interpretation captures the DII with respect to A, B and C. As we have
done above, suppose that x believes that A in w. This is incompatible with the
basic ignorance condition of the prejacent w ∈ info(x wonders whether A, B, or C).
Now suppose that x believes not-A in w. Then, the prejacent w ∈ info(x wonders
whether A, B or C) is satisfied only if w ∈ info(x wonders whether B or C), but this
contradicts the conjunct w 6∈ info(x wonders whether B or C). Ignorance as to B and











A remark is in order regarding the one-disjunct formal alternatives in the bottom
three lines in (53), e.g., x wonders whether A. We assume that the whether comple-
ments in these formal alternatives are not proper polar question complements, but
rather alternative question complements involving a single disjunct. More specif-
ically, we take it that the semantic contribution of whether in these cases, and in
alternative questions more generally, is simply to pass up the semantic value of its
sister node, as in (54).18
(54) Jwhether ϕK = JϕK
Given this semantic contribution of whether, the one-disjunct formal alternatives in
(53) are interpreted as follows:
(55) Jx wonders whether AK = {{w | DOXwx 6∈ JAK∧ INQwx ⊆ JAK}}↓
The semantic value in (55) amounts to { /0}, a contradiction. More generally, our
baseline semantics for wonder yields a contradiction for any non-inquisitive com-
plement (Ciardelli & Roelofsen 2015). Thus, the conditions involving one-disjunct
formal alternatives in the bottom three lines in (53) are satisfied by any world w.
Katzir’s structure-sensitive notion of formal alternatives predicts that exhaus-
tification gives rise to DIIs with Disjunction/Conjunction complements, but not
with NP/NumP complements. This is because Disjunction/Conjunction comple-
ments always have complements with fewer disjuncts/conjuncts as their formal
alternatives, as indicated in (56), while such forms do not count as formal alter-
natives for NP/NumP complements, as indicated in (57) (where we assume that
JNPK = {A,B,C}):
(56) a. that/whether A or B . that/whether A, B, or C Disjunction
b. one/which of A and B . one/which of A, B, and C Conjunction
(57) a. one/which of A and B 6. one/which of the NP NP
b. one/which of A and B 6. one/which of the three NPs NumP
This said, we should note that NP/NumP complements may have ‘subdomain al-
ternatives’ equivalent to the formal alternatives with fewer disjuncts/conjuncts in
(57) (Chierchia 2013, Roelofsen & Uegaki 2016). We take the occasional DIIs
18 It is widely assumed that polar questions do not amount to alternative questions with a single disjunct
(Karttunen 1977, Biezma & Rawlins 2012, Guerzoni & Sharvit 2014, Roelofsen 2015). This is
reflected, for instance, by the fact that they involve different prosody (Pruitt & Roelofsen 2013) and
have different patterns for NPI licensing (Guerzoni & Sharvit 2014). As a consequence, the polar
question ‘whether A (or not)’ does not qualify as a formal alternative to the alternative question









Distributive ignorance inferences with wonder and believe
observed in the NP/NumP conditions in Experiment 1 to be due to the availability
of such subdomain alternatives.19 The contrast in the amount of DIIs between the
Disjunction/Conjunction conditions and the NP/NumP conditions is thus ultimately
explained in terms of the difference in activation between structural alternatives
and subdomain alternatives (see e.g., Denić & Chemla 2018, for a similar contrast
between disjunctions and indefinites).
Moreover, given that EXH can be inserted locally, the possibility of local DIIs
within the scope of a quantified subject in Experiment 2 can be accounted for as
well. Concretely, the local DIIs under every detective are derived on the basis of the
following LFs:
(58) a. [Every detective]1 1 EXHΨ [x1 believes that A, B, or C].
b. [Every detective]1 1 EXHΨ [x1 wonders whether A, B, or C].
In contrast to the local application of EXH, the matrix application of EXH, as in the
following LFs, would derive the global DIIs:
(59) a. EXHΨ [[Every detective]1 1 [x1 believes that A, B, or C]].
b. EXHΨ [[Every detective]1 1 [x1 wonders whether A, B, or C]].
While the local DII readings derived from (58) are straightforward, it is useful to
spell out the precise predictions that are made concerning global DIIs. The LF in






w ∈ info(every detective believes that A, B, or C)
& w 6∈ info(every detective believes that A or B)
& w 6∈ info(every detective believes that B or C)
& w 6∈ info(every detective believes that A or C)
& w 6∈ info(every detective believes that A)
& w 6∈ info(every detective believes that B)




The exhaustified meaning in (60) entails that none of the three disjuncts are believed
by every detective and that none of the three disjuncts is excluded by every detective.
In other words, for each disjuncts there is at least one detective who is not convinced
that it is true and one detective (possibly the same) who is not convinced that it is
false.
19 Note that we observed differences between the different versions of Experiment 1 with respect to the
NumP condition (some DIIs with wonder in the original experiment, some with both verbs in the
Geography context, and as much as with disjunctions in the Bus context). This would suggest that the
activation of subdomain alternatives depends on various factors (for instance, in the bus context the
















w ∈ info(every detective wonders whether A, B, or C)
& w 6∈ info(every detective wonders whether A or B)
& w 6∈ info(every detective wonders whether B or C)




This interpretation entails that there is a detective who is ignorant about A. This
follows from the following reasoning: first, given the ignorance condition of the
prejacent, no detective believes A. Furthermore, if a detective believes not-A, then the
detective should entertain B or C, given the entertainment condition of the prejacent.
However, the third line in (61) states that this does not hold for at least one detective.
The same holds for B and C as well. Overall, (61) entails that each of A, B or C is
considered possible by at least one detective, and none is believed by any detective.
Chierchia et al. (2012) discuss two possible principles for disambiguating be-
tween the different parses of a sentence corresponding to different placements of
EXH. First, they consider a preference for the strongest possible parse (cf. Dalrymple
et al. 1998). This would predict a preference for local exhaustification under every
and global exhaustification with no, but it wouldn’t make any prediction for exactly
n with n > 1 since the local and global parses are logically independent in this
case (and both stronger than the parse without exhaustification). This principle is
also problematic in that it would require a number of comparisons which increases
exponentially with the number of possible placements of EXH. Chierchia et al.
(2012) then consider an alternative principle which is less demanding in terms of the
required number of comparisons: a parse with EXH is marked if it is weaker than the
corresponding parse without EXH, but different parses with EXH are not compared
to each other. This makes parses with EXH in downward-entailing environments
marked, but does not distinguish between the global and local parses for every and
exactly. More recently, Bergen et al. (2016) proposed a probabilistic pragmatic
model for the disambiguation of sentences with embedded scalar terms, and Potts
et al. (2016) showed that the quantitative predictions of such a model regarding the
rates of local/global readings can be rather accurate. Most importantly, the pattern
we observed is similar to their experimental results on embedded scalars, and any
refinement of the theory of local exhaustification that explains the robust local effect
under non-monotonic quantifiers and the markedness of exhaustification under no
would explain the pattern we observed with DIIs as well.
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7 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have presented two experiments concerning distributive ignorance
inferences (DIIs) triggered by sentences involving the attitude predicates wonder and
believe. The results suggest that such DIIs result from a strengthening mechanism
which is sensitive to the syntactic structure of the complement of the verbs involved
(cf. Katzir 2007) and which optionally applies locally, as part of the semantic
composition process (cf. Chierchia et al. 2012).
Looking beyond the domain of DIIs with wonder and believe, our experimental
results make a contribution to the experimental investigation of local strengthening
more generally. Of particular interest is the finding that the extent to which DIIs
arise locally, i.e., in the scope of quantifiers with different monotonicity properties, is
similar to the extent to which scalar items like some and or are strengthened locally.
An interesting avenue for future research would be to consider whether this finding,
as well as further experimental work on DIIs, may be able to tease apart different
theoretical accounts of local strengthening (Chierchia et al. 2012, Geurts & van Tiel
2013, Potts et al. 2016). In particular, the approach of Chierchia et al. (2012), which
derives local strengthening by postulating covert exhaustivity operators, seems to
be able to derive DIIs quite straightforwardly. The approach of Bergen et al. (2016)
and Potts et al. (2016) is framed in terms of lexical underspecification rather than
presence/absence of a covert operator, but it could easily be reframed in term of
exhaustification. For the pragmatic approach of Geurts & van Tiel (2013), which
relies on typicality effects in the interpretation of specific lexical items and narrow
focus on scalar terms, it is, at least at first sight, not so clear how the account of
scalar items like some and or could be extended. The kind of inferences discussed
here do not seem to arise from any specific lexical item, but rather from the interplay
between several elements, making it very unlikely that the implicature would be
conventionalized, and it is not clear that local DIIs require any specific focus.
However, a careful discussion of this issue must be left for another occasion.
Another avenue for further research is to compare the proposal made here
with that of Blumberg (2017) (which was published after the present paper had
been submitted for publication). Our experimental findings on local DIIs seem
problematic for Blumberg’s proposal, but may be compatible with a refined version
of it. Blumberg points out that the two proposals also make different predictions
about DIIs arising when wonder takes a polar disjunctive question as its complement,
rather than an alternative question. Since the judgments in these cases seem rather
subtle, a proper comparison of the two approaches in this regard would have to be
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A Replication of Experiment 1 with other contexts
We replicated Experiment 1 with two other contexts, which we will call the Bus
context and the Geography context.
(62) Bus context: Bill is visiting his friend Sue. She will still be at work when
he lands, so she cannot come to pick him up at the airport. Bill wants to
spend as little as possible, so he won’t take a taxi. Fortunately three bus
lines run from the airport to Sue’s neighborhood: line 6, line 11, and line
2E. Line 2E is an express line, and it’s more expensive. Sue can pick up Bill
at the bus stop on her way back from work, but she needs to know which
bus line he is taking because they each serve a different stop. Knowing Bill,
Sue knows that he won’t take a taxi, and she is even convinced that he won’t
use the express line because of the extra fee. However, Sue doesn’t know
whether he will take line 6 or line 11.
(63) Geography context: Sue, an 11th-grade student, has to choose which
subjects she will take next year. Her choice depends on who will be teaching
the subjects. The school has three geography teachers: Mr. Smith, Ms.
Adams, and Mr. Brown. Sue knows that the school will not hire any new
geography teacher next year, so one of the current teachers will have to teach
12th-grade geography. She also thinks that Ms. Adams won’t be teaching
next year because she will be on an exchange.

















False Sue wonders whether Bill is taking line 2E.
Target Sue wonders whether Bill is taking line 6, 11, or 2E.
True Sue wonders whether Bill is taking line 6 or 11.
CONJ
False Sue wonders whether Bill is taking line 2E.
Target Sue wonders which of line 6, 11 and 2E Bill is taking.
True Sue wonders which of lines 6 and 11 Bill is taking.
NP
False Sue wonders whether Bill is taking line 2E.
Target Sue wonders which bus line Bill is taking.
True Sue wonders which regular line Bill is taking.
NUMP
False Sue wonders whether Bill is taking line 2E.
Target Sue wonders which of the three lines Bill is taking.





False Sue believes that Bill is taking line 2E.
Target Sue believes that Bill is taking line 6, 11, or 2E.
True Sue believes that Bill is taking line 6 or 11.
CONJ
False Sue believes that Bill is taking line 2E.
Target Sue believes that Bill is taking one of line 6, 11 and 2E.
True Sue believes that Bill is taking one of lines 6 and 11.
NP
False Sue believes that Bill is taking line 2E.
Target Sue believes that Bill is taking one of the bus lines.
True Sue believes that Bill is taking one of the regular lines.
NUMP
False Sue believes that Bill is taking line 2E.
Target Sue believes that Bill is taking one of line 6, 11 and 2E.
True Sue believes that Bill is taking one of the two regular lines.
Fillers False Bill will probably take a taxi from the airport.True Sue doesn’t know at which bus stop she needs to pick up Bill.
















False Sue wonders whether or not Ms. Adams will teach the 12th-grade geography classnext year.
Target Sue wonders whether Mr. Smith, Ms. Adams, or Mr. Brown will teach the12th-grade geography class next year.
True Sue wonders whether Mr. Smith or Mr. Brown will teach the 12th-grade geographyclass next year.
CONJ
False Sue wonders whether or not Ms. Adams will teach the 12th-grade geography classnext year.
Target Sue wonders which of Mr. Smith, Ms. Adams, and Mr. Brown will teach the12th-grade geography class next year.
True Sue wonders which of Mr. Smith and Mr. Brown will teach the 12th-gradegeography class next year.
NP
False Sue wonders whether or not Ms. Adams will teach the 12th-grade geography classnext year.
Target Sue wonders which of the geography teachers will teach the 12th-grade geographyclass next year.
True Sue wonders which of the male geography teachers will teach the 12th-gradegeography class next year.
NUMP
False Sue wonders whether or not Ms. Adams will teach the 12th-grade geography classnext year.
Target Sue wonders which of the three geography teachers will teach the 12th-gradegeography class next year.





False Sue believes that Ms. Adams will teach the 12th-grade geography class next year.
Target Sue believes that Mr. Smith, Ms. Adams, or Mr. Brown will teach the 12th-gradegeography class next year.
True Sue believes that Mr. Smith or Mr. Brown will teach the 12th-grade geography classnext year.
CONJ
False Sue believes that Ms. Adams will teach the 12th-grade geography class next year.
Target Sue believes that one of Mr. Smith, Ms. Adams, and Mr. Brown will teach the12th-grade geography class next year.
True Sue believes that one of Mr. Smith and Mr. Brown will teach the 12th-gradegeography class next year.
NP
False Sue believes that Ms. Adams will teach the 12th-grade geography class next year.
Target Sue believes that one of the current teachers will teach the 12th-grade geographyclass next year.
True Sue believes that one of the male geography teachers will teach the 12th-gradegeography class next year.
NUMP
False Sue believes that Ms. Adams will teach the 12th-grade geography class next year.
Target Sue believes that one of the three current geography teachers will teach the12th-grade geography class next year.
True Sue believes that one of the two male geography teachers will teach the 12th-gradegeography class next year.
Fillers False Sue thinks that the school will hire a new geography teacher.True Sue is considering taking geography in 12th grade.
Table 7 Stimuli for the Geography context replication of Experiment 1
A.1 Design
The design was nearly identical to Experiment 1, except that each participant saw
eight items: a target, a true control and a false control for each verb, plus two











factor remained between-participants. We further introduced a between-participants
CONTEXT factor with two levels (Bus and Geography). Apart from addressing
some of the reviewers’ concerns regarding Experiment 1, increasing the number of
items per participant also made the survey more attractive on Mechanical Turk (for
the same hourly rate, participants usually prefer longer tasks on MTurk, and some
participants filter tasks below 50¢). This made recruitment much faster and reduced
the risk that participants would take the survey multiple times.
Moving from 3 to 8 items means we went from 6 possible orders to 40320, so we
could not test them all. We first restricted ourselves to the permutations which had
the following structure: three pairs of one true and one false control or filler each,
interspersed with the two targets. Furthermore, we required that the items in each
pair of controls/fillers would not be controls for the same verb, or both be fillers. We
had 8 sets of items (2 Contexts × 4 Complements), and we tested each of them with
48 different orders among the 192 options satisfying our constraints.21
A.2 Participants
384 participants (48 for each set of items) were recruited on Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk and paid 57¢ each. No two participants saw the same set of items in the same
order. The data from 8 participants who reported native languages other than English
were discarded. This time, we only observed three retakes, which were discarded
from the analysis and not paid.
21 More concretely: we first picked a permutation σ in S3 for the two true controls and the true filler
(6 possibilities). We then picked σ ′ for the false controls and filler as one of the two permutations
in S3 such that ∀i,σ ′(i) 6= σ(i) (2 possibilities). Three pairs i ∈ {1,2,3} were formed with True
control/filler σ(i) and False control/filler σ ′(i). We then picked three permutations σ1,σ2,σ3 ∈S2, to
randomize the order of the true and false item in each pair of controls/fillers (23 possibilities), and one
last permutation σS to randomize the order of the wonder and believe targets (2 possibilities). In all,
this lead to 6×2×8×2 = 192 possible orders. For each set of items, we tested all 48 combinations
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A.3 Results
Disjunction:
that/whether A, B, or C
Conjunction:












































Figure 6 Replications of Experiment 1: Acceptability for each Verb, Comple-
ment, and Sentence by Context (boxes indicate median and quartiles,
each dot represents an individual answer). The results of the original
experiment (Children context) are repeated in the first row.
The results of the replications are presented in Figure 6. To compare the results of
the replications with the original experiment, we added a CONTEXT factor to the
mixed-model and ran it on the data from all three versions of the experiment. We
also included a random slope for VERB since this factor varied within-participant
for a subset of the participants.
(64) clmm(Answer∼Condition*Verb*Comp*Context+(1+Verb|Subject))
where CONDITION is 0 for True controls and 1 for Targets, VERB is sum-
coded, COMPLEMENT is treatment-coded with Disjunction as the baseline,












The results are presented in Table 8. We observed four significant effects of context
(before any correction): targets were more acceptable in the Geography context
(suggesting weaker DII), but still clearly distinct from true controls with Disjunction
COMPLEMENTS, and there were some differences with NumP COMPLEMENTS. In
both new contexts, NumP targets were more degraded than in the original experiment,
and in the Bus context the effect of VERB was not observed.
As a post-hoc analysis, we tested the difference between the NP and NumP
COMPLEMENTS by comparing a model that distinguishes the two from one that
doesn’t. We found a clear difference in both Bus (χ2(4) = 151, p < .001) and
Geography contexts (χ2(4) = 20, p < .001), while there was none in Experiment 1.
Finally, we compared two models for the responses to targets other than NumP
across contexts: one in which all interactions between CONTEXT, VERB and COM-
PLEMENT were included, and one without any interaction between CONTEXT and
the two other factors. The model with all interactions did not show any significant
improvement compared to the simpler model (χ2(10) = 11.4, p = .33), suggesting
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β z-value p-value
SENTENCE:Target -4.26 -12.99 < .001???
VERB -0.04 -0.09 .929
COMPLEMENT:Conjunction 0.53 1.39 .165
COMPLEMENT:NP -0.04 -0.13 .899
COMPLEMENT:NumP 0.03 0.09 .930
CONTEXT:Bus 0.65 1.70 .088
CONTEXT:Geography -0.60 -1.74 .083
[SENTENCE:Target]×VERB 0.27 0.44 .660
[SENTENCE:Target]×[COMPLEMENT:Conjunction] 0.58 1.26 .208
[SENTENCE:Target]×[COMPLEMENT:NP] 3.44 7.76 < .001???
[SENTENCE:Target]×[COMPLEMENT:NumP] 2.94 6.57 < .001???
VERB×[COMPLEMENT:Conjunction] 0.36 0.47 .639
VERB×[COMPLEMENT:NP] 0.78 1.12 .264
VERB×[COMPLEMENT:NumP] 1.60 2.23 .026?
[SENTENCE:Target]×[CONTEXT:Bus] 0.36 0.80 .425
[SENTENCE:Target]×[CONTEXT:Geo] 2.25 5.32 < .001???
VERB×[CONTEXT:Bus] 0.20 0.28 .783
VERB×[CONTEXT:Geo] -0.57 -0.88 .376
[COMPLEMENT:Conjunction]×[CONTEXT:Bus] -0.18 -0.31 .758
[COMPLEMENT:NP]×[CONTEXT:Bus] 0.35 0.64 .522
[COMPLEMENT:NumP]×[CONTEXT:Bus] -0.20 -0.38 .704
[COMPLEMENT:Conjunction]×[CONTEXT:Geo] 0.56 1.06 .289
[COMPLEMENT:NP]×[CONTEXT:Geo] 0.16 0.32 .748
[COMPLEMENT:NumP]×[CONTEXT:Geo] -0.25 -0.51 .612
[SENTENCE:Target]×VERB×[COMPLEMENT:Conjunction] -1.45 -1.57 .116
[SENTENCE:Target]×VERB×[COMPLEMENT:NP] -1.77 -2.04 .041?
[SENTENCE:Target]×VERB×[COMPLEMENT:NumP] -2.92 -3.31 < .001???
[SENTENCE:Target]×VERB×[CONTEXT:Bus] -0.44 -0.50 .618
[SENTENCE:Target]×VERB×[CONTEXT:Geo] 0.77 0.91 .360
[SENTENCE:Target]×[COMPLEMENT:Conjunction]×[CONTEXT:Bus] -0.11 -0.17 .862
[SENTENCE:Target]×[COMPLEMENT:NP]×[CONTEXT:Bus] 0.49 0.72 .469
[SENTENCE:Target]×[COMPLEMENT:NumP]×[CONTEXT:Bus] -2.93 -4.59 < .001???
[SENTENCE:Target]×[COMPLEMENT:Conjunction]×[CONTEXT:Geo] -0.64 -1.03 .304
[SENTENCE:Target]×[COMPLEMENT:NP]×[CONTEXT:Geo] -0.53 -0.86 .392
[SENTENCE:Target]×[COMPLEMENT:NumP]×[CONTEXT:Geo] -1.35 -2.24 .025?
VERB×[COMPLEMENT:Conjunction]×[CONTEXT:Bus] -0.30 -0.27 .784
VERB×[COMPLEMENT:NP]×[CONTEXT:Bus] -0.42 -0.40 .687
VERB×[COMPLEMENT:NumP]×[CONTEXT:Bus] -1.89 -1.84 .065
VERB×[COMPLEMENT:Conjunction]×[CONTEXT:Geo] -0.01 -0.01 .990
VERB×[COMPLEMENT:NP]×[CONTEXT:Geo] -0.58 -0.63 .528
VERB×[COMPLEMENT:NumP]×[CONTEXT:Geo] -1.72 -1.84 .066
[SENTENCE:Target]×VERB×[COMPLEMENT:Conjunction]×[CONTEXT:Bus] 0.95 0.73 .467
[SENTENCE:Target]×VERB×[COMPLEMENT:NP]×[CONTEXT:Bus] 1.42 1.06 .289
[SENTENCE:Target]×VERB×[COMPLEMENT:NumP]×[CONTEXT:Bus] 3.16 2.50 .012?
[SENTENCE:Target]×VERB×[COMPLEMENT:Conjunction]×[CONTEXT:Geo] 0.13 0.11 .916
[SENTENCE:Target]×VERB×[COMPLEMENT:NP]×[CONTEXT:Geo] 0.76 0.62 .535
[SENTENCE:Target]×VERB×[COMPLEMENT:NumP]×[CONTEXT:Geo] 1.76 1.46 .144
Table 8 Results of the model comparing the replications of Experiment 1 to the
original experiment. Effects of interest in the original experiment are
highlighted in blue, while their interaction with context are highlighted
in brown. The standard deviation of the random effects was .78 for the
intercept and .15 for the slope.











B Replication of Experiment 2 with other contexts
We replicated Experiment 2 with two other contexts, which we will call the Chefs
context and the Geography context (the latter was very similar to the Geography
context used to replicate Experiment 1). The contexts shared the same structure as
the Detective context used in our original Experiment 2. In particular, they came in
two versions: one for the quantifiers every and no, and one for the quantifier exactly,
and they made the local DII reading true for every, and false for exactly and no.
(65) Chefs context:
a. every/no version: There are three chefs taking part in a yearly evalua-
tion, in which they can be rated 0, 1, 2 or 3 stars. They have to carry
out three difficult assignments. For each assignment that they carry out
in an excellent way, they get one star. They are currently waiting for
the jury’s final announcement. Two chefs think that they performed
perfectly on one of tasks, but that they failed one of the assignments.
This means that they could end up with either one or two stars. The
last chef thinks that she failed to complete two of the assignments.
This means that she could end up with at most one star.
b. exactly version: There are three chefs taking part in a yearly evalua-
tion, in which they can be rated 0, 1, 2 or 3 stars. They have to carry
out three difficult assignments. For each assignment that they carry out
in an excellent way, they get one star. They are currently waiting for
the jury’s announcement. One chef thinks that she failed to complete
two of the assignments. This means that she could end up with at most
one star. The two other chefs think that they failed to complete one of
the assignments, so they could end up with at most two stars.
(66) Geography context:
a. every/no version: Thirty 11th-grade students have to choose which
subjects they will take next year. The students’ choices depend on who
will be teaching the subjects. The school has four geography teachers:
Mr. Smith, Ms. Jones, Ms. Adams, and Mr. Brown. Only one of them
will teach 12th-grade geography next year, and no new teacher will
be recruited. All students know that Ms. Jones won’t be teaching next
year because she will be on an exchange. One student additionally
knows that Mr. Smith won’t be teaching the 12th-grade geography
next year because he will be teaching the 10th-grade geography class.
Two other students think that Ms. Adams won’t be teaching next year.
All students believe that it is possible that Mr. Brown will teach next
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b. exactly version: Ten 11th-grade students have to choose which sub-
jects they will take next year. The students’ choices depend on who
will be teaching the subjects. The school has four geography teachers:
Mr. Smith, Ms. Jones, Ms. Adams, and Mr. Brown. Only one of them
will teach 12th-grade geography next year, and no new teacher will
be recruited. All students know that Ms. Jones won’t be teaching next
year because she will be on an exchange. Two students additionally
think that Mr. Smith won’t be teaching the 12th-grade geography next
year because he will be teaching the 10th-grade geography class. All
students believe that it is possible that Mr. Brown or Ms. Adams will
teach next year, and no student is aware of what others know or think.








False Every chef wonders whether or not she will be rated three stars.
Target Every chef wonders whether she will be rated zero, one, or two stars.
True Every chef wonders whether or not she will be rated one star.
No
False No chef wonders whether or not she will be rated one star.
Target No chef wonders whether she will be rated zero, one, or two stars.
True No chef wonders whether or not she will be rated three stars.
Exactly
False Exactly two chefs wonder whether or not they will be rated three stars.
Target Exactly two chefs wonder whether they will be rated zero, one, or two stars.





False Every chef believes that she might be rated three stars.
Target Every chef believes that she might be rated zero, one, or two stars.
True Every chef believes that she might be rated one star.
No
False No chef believes that she might be rated one star.
Target No chef believes that she might be rated zero, one, or two stars.
True No chef believes that she might be rated three stars.
Exactly
False Exactly two chefs believe that they might be rated three stars.
Target Exactly two chefs believe that they might be rated zero, one, or two stars.
True Exactly two chefs believe that they might be rated two stars.
Fillers False Every chef will be rated at least one star.True No chef will be rated three stars.

















False Every student wonders whether or not Ms. Adams will teach the 12th-gradegeography class next year.
Target Every student wonders whether Mr. Smith, Ms. Adams, or Mr. Brown will teachthe 12th-grade geography class next year.
True Every student wonders whether or not Mr. Brown will teach the 12th-gradegeography class next year.
No
False No student wonders whether or not Mr. Smith will teach the 12th-gradegeography class next year.
Target No student wonders whether Mr. Smith, Ms. Adams, or Mr. Brown will teachthe 12th-grade geography class next year.
True No student wonders whether or not Ms. Jones will teach the 12th-gradegeography class next year.
Exactly
False Exactly eight students wonder whether or not Ms. Jones will teach the12th-grade geography class next year.
Target Exactly eight students wonder whether Mr. Smith, Ms. Adams, or Mr. Brownwill teach the 12th-grade geography class next year.





False Every student believes that Ms. Adams may be teaching the 12th-gradegeography class next year.
Target Every student believes that Mr. Smith, Ms. Adams, or Mr. Brown will teach the12th-grade geography class next year.
True Every student believes that Mr. Brown may be teaching the 12th-gradegeography class next year.
No
False No student believes that Mr. Smith may be teaching the 12th-grade geographyclass next year.
Target No student believes that Mr. Smith, Ms. Adams, or Mr. Brown will teach the12th-grade geography class next year.
True No student believes that Ms. Jones may be teaching the 12th-grade geographyclass next year.
Exactly
False Exactly eight students believe that Ms. Jones may be teaching the 12th-gradegeography class next year.
Target Exactly eight students believe that Mr. Smith, Ms. Adams, or Mr. Brown willteach the 12th-grade geography class next year.
True Exactly eight students believe that Mr. Smith may be teaching the 12th-gradegeography class next year.
Fillers False The students think that the school will hire a new geography teacher.True The students can take geography in 12th grade.
Table 10 Stimuli for the Geography context replication of Experiment 2
B.1 Design
Once again, the design was nearly identical to Experiment 2, but VERB was made
a within-participant factor and two fillers were added for a total of eight items per
participant. QUANTIFIER remained a between-participants factor and we introduced
a between-participants CONTEXT factor with two levels (Chefs and Geography).
We did not use colors this time, since one reviewer expressed some doubts as to










Distributive ignorance inferences with wonder and believe
We followed a randomization procedure similar to that described in Appendix A,
but for each of the 6 possible sets of items, we recruited 96 participants, each tested
on a different order of these items.22
B.2 Participants
576 participants (96 for each set of items) were recruited on Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk and paid 57¢ each. No two participants saw the same set of items in the
same order. The data from 16 participants who reported native languages other than
English were discarded. We observed 7 retakes this time, which were discarded from










































Figure 7 Replication of Experiment 2: Acceptability for each Verb, Quantifier,
and Sentence by Context (boxes indicate median and quartiles, each dot
represents an individual answer). The results of the original experiment
(Detective context) are repeated in the first row.
22 Concretely, we tested all combinations of σ ,σ ′,σ1,σ2,σ3, and only randomly picked one of the two











The results are presented in Figure 7. We ran the same analysis as in Experiment 2,




Table 11 presents the results of the model. While the overall pattern for targets didn’t
differ much from the original experiment, we observed a few differences which
are mainly driven by differences in the control items. In particular, the true every
and no controls in the Chefs context and the true exactly controls in the Geography
context received surprisingly low ratings, which affects our measure of local DIIs in
these cases, even though the target sentences behaved very much as in the original
experiment.
Nevertheless, we again observed local DIIs under every in both contexts, less
DIIs under no and more DIIs under exactly. We observed a small difference in the
effect of VERB in the Geography context. Nevertheless, across the three contexts,
VERB still didn’t reach significance (χ2(9) = 16, p = .066).
Finally, we fitted a model on data from the quantifier no only and found that
there was no effect of LOCAL in the Chefs context (z =−.25, p = .80), nor in the
Geography context (z = −1.6, p = .10), unlike in the original Detective context









Distributive ignorance inferences with wonder and believe
β z-value p-value
BASELINE 4.46 15.82 < .001???
LOCAL 2.90 12.90 < .001???
VERB 1.49 3.60 < .001???
QUANTIFIER:no -0.27 -0.90 .370
QUANTIFIER:exaclty -1.33 -3.77 < .001???
CONTEXT:Chefs 0.39 1.34 .179
CONTEXT:Geography 1.29 4.65 < .001???
BASELINE×VERB -1.18 -2.17 .030?
LOCAL×VERB 0.55 1.25 .211
BASELINE×[QUANTIFIER:no] 1.50 3.67 < .001???
BASELINE×[QUANTIFIER:exaclty] 2.09 4.74 < .001???
LOCAL×[QUANTIFIER:no] -2.31 -6.71 < .001???
LOCAL×[QUANTIFIER:exaclty] 2.06 5.32 < .001???
VERB×[QUANTIFIER:no] -2.09 -3.52 < .001???
VERB×[QUANTIFIER:exaclty] -1.85 -2.62 .009??
BASELINE×[CONTEXT:Chefs] -1.49 -3.89 < .001???
BASELINE×[CONTEXT:Geography] -1.16 -3.09 .002??
LOCAL×[CONTEXT:Chefs] -2.52 -8.50 < .001???
LOCAL×[CONTEXT:Geography] -0.70 -2.32 .020?
VERB×[CONTEXT:Chefs] -0.75 -1.43 .152
VERB×[CONTEXT:Geography] -0.34 -0.68 .497
[QUANTIFIER:no]×[CONTEXT:Chefs] 0.62 1.52 .129
[QUANTIFIER:exaclty]×[CONTEXT:Chefs] 1.80 3.95 < .001???
[QUANTIFIER:no]×[CONTEXT:Geography] 0.11 0.27 .786
[QUANTIFIER:exaclty]×[CONTEXT:Geography] 0.15 0.33 .742
BASELINE×VERB×[QUANTIFIER:no] 1.51 1.86 .064
BASELINE×VERB×[QUANTIFIER:exaclty] 2.38 2.71 .007??
LOCAL×VERB×[QUANTIFIER:no] 0.03 0.05 .960
LOCAL×VERB×[QUANTIFIER:exaclty] 0.61 0.79 .430
BASELINE×VERB×[CONTEXT:Chefs] 0.71 1.03 .302
BASELINE×VERB×[CONTEXT:Geography] -0.76 -1.12 .264
LOCAL×VERB×[CONTEXT:Chefs] -0.55 -0.94 .346
LOCAL×VERB×[CONTEXT:Geography] -1.28 -2.15 .031?
BASELINE×[QUANTIFIER:no]×[CONTEXT:Chefs] -1.33 -2.38 .017?
BASELINE×[QUANTIFIER:exaclty]×[CONTEXT:Chefs] -1.24 -2.12 .034?
BASELINE×[QUANTIFIER:no]×[CONTEXT:Geography] -0.53 -0.93 .351
BASELINE×[QUANTIFIER:exaclty]×[CONTEXT:Geography] -2.68 -4.54 < .001???
LOCAL×[QUANTIFIER:no]×[CONTEXT:Chefs] 1.87 4.15 < .001???
LOCAL×[QUANTIFIER:exaclty]×[CONTEXT:Chefs] -0.38 -0.79 .429
LOCAL×[QUANTIFIER:no]×[CONTEXT:Geography] -0.40 -0.89 .375
LOCAL×[QUANTIFIER:exaclty]×[CONTEXT:Geography] -1.47 -2.98 .003??
VERB×[QUANTIFIER:no]×[CONTEXT:Chefs] 1.18 1.58 .113
VERB×[QUANTIFIER:exaclty]×[CONTEXT:Chefs] 1.95 2.32 .020?
VERB×[QUANTIFIER:no]×[CONTEXT:Geography] 0.67 0.93 .353
VERB×[QUANTIFIER:exaclty]×[CONTEXT:Geography] 1.03 1.21 .225
BASELINE×VERB×[QUANTIFIER:no]×[CONTEXT:Chefs] -1.51 -1.50 .134
BASELINE×VERB×[QUANTIFIER:exaclty]×[CONTEXT:Chefs] -3.02 -2.82 .005??
BASELINE×VERB×[QUANTIFIER:no]×[CONTEXT:Geography] -0.12 -0.11 .910
BASELINE×VERB×[QUANTIFIER:exaclty]×[CONTEXT:Geography] -0.03 -0.03 .974
LOCAL×VERB×[QUANTIFIER:no]×[CONTEXT:Chefs] 0.43 0.48 .633
LOCAL×VERB×[QUANTIFIER:exaclty]×[CONTEXT:Chefs] -1.56 -1.64 .102
LOCAL×VERB×[QUANTIFIER:no]×[CONTEXT:Geography] 0.64 0.71 .475
LOCAL×VERB×[QUANTIFIER:exaclty]×[CONTEXT:Geography] -0.01 -0.01 .993
Table 11 Results of the model comparing the replications of Experiment 2 to the
original experiment. Effects of interest in the original experiment are
highlighted in blue, and their interaction with CONTEXT in brown. The
standard deviation of the random effects was 1.14 for the intercept, 1.58
for BASELINE, .14 for VERB, and .38 for the interaction.
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